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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

S

overeign debt crises occur regularly and often
violently. The recent debt crisis in Greece almost led to the collapse of the Euro. Yet there
is no legally and politically recognized procedure
for restructuring the debt of bankrupt sovereigns.
Procedures of this type have been periodically debated—most recently, about a decade ago, when
IMF management proposed a global sovereign
debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM). They have
so far been rejected. Countries have been reluctant
to give up power to supranational rules or institutions. Creditors and debtors have felt that there
were sufficient instruments for addressing debt
crises at hoc. Importantly, there were also fears
that making debt easier to restructure would raise
the costs and reduce the amounts of sovereign
borrowing in many countries. This was perceived
to be against the interests of both the providers of
both creditors and major borrowers.

that decline a restructuring offer the right
to interfere with payments to the creditors
that accept such an offer. This will complicate efforts to resolve future debt crises on
an ad hoc basis.
•

To address these problems, the report presents
policy proposals at two levels: for the Euro area,
and globally.
The Euro area differs from other integrated regions both in that its members have fewer instruments to deal with debt crises—they cannot
devalue or inflate—and because a crisis in one
member can have catastrophic consequences for
others (by threatening the common currency).
This requires both a mechanism for the orderly
resolution of debt crises and stronger incentives to
prevent them. The current financial architecture in
the Euro area is inadequate in this respect, because
its main pillar—the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM)—is not set up to deal with unsustainable
debt. If it is used even when there are significant
concerns about the ability of borrowers to repay
their debts, it will become source of transfers, rather than just crisis lending.

This year’s CIEPR report argues that both the
nature and our understanding of sovereign debt
problems have changed in ways that create a much
stronger case for an orderly sovereign bankruptcy
regime today than ten years ago.
•

•

Sovereign debt crises are no longer just a
problem in emerging markets, but a core
concern in advanced countries as well—
particularly in the Euro area. If the Euro
is to survive, this will require both better
ways to resolve debt crises and stronger,
market-based incentives that prevent debt
problems from occurring in the first place.

Pre-crisis policy mistakes—and in particular, the tendency of domestic policymakers to overborrow or pay too little attention to private debt accumulation that
might turn public—are now recognized to
be a much more severe problem for borrowing countries than the costs or limited
availability of private financing. Far from
being a problem, proposals that would
limit the ability to borrow for countries
with poor policies are a good thing.

These problems could be addressed via an amendment of the ESM treaty that encourages and legitimizes—both legally and politically—debt restructuring in unsustainable debt cases.

Recent court rulings—particularly a recent
U.S. ruling that gives “holdout creditors”
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•

First, assets and revenues of countries
undertaking a debt restructuring would
be deemed immune from legal action by
holdouts if a restructuring is approved by
the ESM.

•

Second, the treaty would require a debt restructuring as a condition for ESM lending
when national debts exceed a pre-set level.
This should be higher than the Maastricht
limit of 60 percent of GDP, but not so high
as to render the constraint meaningless. In
the Euro area, this may mean a level about
1 ½ times the Maastricht limit. The presence of such a debt threshold would help
differentiate borrowing costs in normal
times based on the strength of economic
policies. At the same time, it would protect ESM resources and Euro area taxpayers, and prevent extreme adjustments of
public finances at the expense of citizens
who usually have little control over policy mistakes leading to excessive sovereign
debt.

debt exchange offers, and bringing into question
the IMF’s priority status, will make this problem
worse. To address this without allowing sovereigns
to frivolously repudiate their debts, two alternative
mechanisms are proposed.

Importantly, Euro area countries must be given a
chance to deal with legacy debt before this regime
is introduced. For countries significantly above
the future upper debt threshold, this will require
a judgment of whether debt can be reduced below
the limit within a reasonable time frame. Where
the answer is no, the Euro area needs to make a
choice between an upfront restructuring – backed
by the ESM – and extra support, for example, in
the form of providing a joint and several guarantee
on new debt issuance as long as countries adhere
to an agreed fiscal consolidation path.

•

A coordinated introduction of a strong
form of “collective action clauses” in sovereign bond contract, namely, provisions
that allow for the restructuring of bonded
debt with the agreement of a supermajority of creditors across all bonds.

•

The creation of a Sovereign Debt Adjustment Facility by the International Monetary Fund, which would combine IMF
lending with debt restructuring. A set
of clearly defined ex ante criteria, analogous to those used in the HIPC initiative,
would need to be developed to steer high
debt countries towards this facility. An
amendment of the IMF articles would ensure that the assets of countries using this
facility would be shielded from holdouts
if a supermajority of creditors agrees to a
restructuring.

The main difference between the two proposals is
that the second would do more to correct biases
that delay necessary debt restructuring. Furthermore, while both would deal with the holdout
problem in the long run, the IMF-based proposal
would have immediate effects, while better collective action clauses would become effective only
gradually, as existing debt is replaced by newly issued debt.
The world is currently less equipped to handle
problems of unsustainable debt than at any time
since the 1930s. At the same time, the extent of
these problems has grown. Reform proposals that
could address them have become more mature and
more targeted, and arguments that led to the rejection of analogous proposals 10 years ago no longer
apply. It is time for policy makers to tackle the central problems head on.

At the global level, the relatively small size of the
IMF, its de facto priority and its track record in
getting repaid make it less likely that crisis lending will turn into transfers. However, experience
shows that incentives are stacked against the
timely recognition and restructuring of unsustainable debts. Recent court rulings encouraging
holdouts, discouraging creditor participation in
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CHAPTER 1:

Introduction

S

overeign debt crises tend to trigger calls for
sovereign bankruptcy. In the postwar era, a
first round of such calls coincided with the
great Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s. A
second round accompanied the post-Brady debt
crises, beginning with the 1995 Mexican crisis and
particularly Russia’s 1998 default, and leading to
the International Monetary Fund’s 2001 proposal
for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism
(SDRM), which was intensely debated and finally
rejected by IMF shareholders in April 2003.1 Since
2010, calls for some form of international sovereign bankruptcy regime have returned.2 These
have been motivated partly by events in Europe,
but also by difficulties in restructuring stubbornly
high debt levels in other parts of the world, such as
the Caribbean Sea Basin, and by ongoing litigation
that could make such restructurings even harder.

formulates the economic trade-offs involved with
creating such a regime, explains why and under
what conditions the regime could improve welfare,
and presents options for implementing the regime.
Its main conclusion is that the intellectual case
for—and feasibility of—a sovereign debt workout
mechanism based on some combination of national statutes and international treaty is much stronger now than it was 10 or 20 years ago. This is especially true for the euro zone, where the case for
such a regime is particularly strong and its implementation as a complement to the existing European Stability Mechanism would be comparatively
straightforward.
As background for the logical structure of this report, it is useful to briefly recall the SDRM discussions of the early 2000s. The main focus of this debate was the perceived trade-off between ex-post
and ex-ante efficiency. SDRM proponents based
their proposal on ex-post inefficiency, exemplified
by the successes or near-misses of holdout creditors in cases against Brazil and Peru.3 The argument was that if creditors could expect holdout
strategies to pay off, free riding would become

This report revisits the case for a sovereign bankruptcy regime, understood as a mix of national and
international institutions that would, in some conditions, sanction a comprehensive modification of
sovereign debt contracts, and extend legal protections to the sovereigns and creditors involved. It

For a survey, see Rogoff and Zettelmeyer (2002).
See, e.g., Gianviti et al (2010), Weder di Mauro and Zettelmeyer (2010); EEAG (2011); Bogdandy and Goldmann (2012); and Miller and Thomas
(2013).
3
Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer (2009); Schumacher, Trebesch, and Enderlein (2012).
1
2
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overwhelming, rendering orderly debt restructurings unfeasible. Conversely, SDRM critics focused
on ex-ante efficiency. They argued that since governments could not be easily forced to pay their
debts, sovereign debt was feasible and affordable
only because sovereign debt crises were costly. A
sovereign debt restructuring mechanism whose
express purpose was to lower the cost of debt crises
might do more harm than good by lowering incentives to repay and sharply raising the cost of debt.

mid-1990s had been resolved fairly quickly without
statutory bankruptcy, and did not lead to litigation
by holdouts. Those who worried about holdouts, in
lieu of a treaty change, got market-wide contract reform, whereby collective action clauses were introduced in most New York law bonds issued beginning 2003. This was rationalized as a small step toward a more ex-post efficient resolution, which was
unlikely to upset markets ex ante (and it did not).

In principle, there was a way of balancing the
trade-off between ex-post costs and ex-ante incentives: an SDRM involving a “double trigger”—
namely, the debtor country would be able to make
a request for assistance (analogous to filing for
bankruptcy protection), and a bankruptcy courtlike institution could reject frivolous requests.
However, from the perspective of SDRM critics,
this solution had two weaknesses. First, private
creditors might not trust the bankruptcy court—
particularly if it were the IMF, which was viewed as
both susceptible to political pressure and subject
to conflicts of interests through its own role as a
large creditor. Second, perverse incentives created
by lower crisis costs might extend beyond incentives to repudiate—encompassing a broad range
of precrisis policies that influenced the chances
of getting into debt-servicing difficulties. Hence,
to create good incentives for debtor countries, an
international bankruptcy court would need to not
only distinguish between an “ability to pay” and a
“willingness to pay” crisis but also judge whether an “ability to pay” crisis were mainly the fault
of the country or the result of bad luck. This was
viewed as a tall order for any institution—particularly those that might not be fully independent,
and that might be sympathetic to a country’s plight
regardless of its causes.

Since 2003 there have been three developments
that add to, and might have changed the balance
of, the set of arguments outlined above. First, research on sovereign debt problems has evolved
to take a broader and somewhat different view
of the “ex-ante problem.” As an empirical matter,
the traditional enforcement problem seems to be
overshadowed by moral hazard problems of a different kind. Debtor countries have control over
key factors—their debt levels, debt structure and
prospects for economic growth—that determine
their ability to pay. Additional moral hazard problems may be created at the expense of third parties.
These problems can result in overborrowing, along
with delays in seeking unavoidable sovereign debt
restructurings. The consensus seems to have shifted away from the fear that countries might restructure opportunistically to the fear that they might
restructure too late, and that these restructurings
might not be deep enough. This has fundamental
implications for the debate on sovereign bankruptcy: If the main problem in sovereign debt is not repudiating debtors and overly tight borrowing constraints, but rather overborrowing at the front end
and procrastination at the back end, then the old
trade-off between ex-ante and ex-post efficiency
no longer holds, at least within some range. Lowering the costs of debt crises ex post might benefit
efficiency ex ante.

The SDRM was rejected in 2003, in part because the
United States and large emerging market borrowers could not be convinced that its ex-post benefits
outweighed its ex-ante risks, and partly because
the ex-post costs of the status quo did not seem
intractable at the time; most debt crises since the

Second, the holdout problem has experienced a
rejuvenation. One of the arguments against the
SDRM was that it was a heavy-handed way of addressing a problem—coordination failures in debt
restructuring—that could be solved easily using
procedures and legal techniques that debtors could
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invoke unilaterally. For example, take-it-or-leave-it
debt exchange offers, backed by minimum participation thresholds and exit consents, allowed debtors to strip holdouts of enforcement weapons with
the agreement of a simple majority of bondholders. However, recent court rulings against Argentina in New York give creditors tools to overcome
such tactics. At the same time, bond contracts have
developed to require supermajorities for the most
powerful exit amendments, which are no longer as
potent a solution as they were in the restructurings of the early 2000s. Further, investors pursuing
holdout strategies have become increasingly effective, as a function of both their financing and their
legal sophistication. As a result, successful debt restructurings have become harder to achieve, even
if they are in the interests of both the debtor and a
large majority of creditors.

statutory approach toward sovereign bankruptcy
may stand a better chance in the euro area than
elsewhere.
The remainder of this report follows the structure
of these three arguments. We begin with a survey
of shifting views on the pathologies in sovereign
debt. We next discuss the impact of recent litigation and changes in bond contracts on ad hoc
debt restructurings. This is followed by a chapter
that argues why a more systematic approach to
sovereign debt restructuring might be particularly needed in the euro area. The final chapter presents a number of proposals that could address the
problem. These include a proposal to modify the
2012 treaty establishing the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM) to require debt restructuring as
a condition of ESM assistance in predefined circumstances, and to immunize the assets of those
countries that have undergone ESM-sanctioned
restructurings from attachments by holdout creditors. At the broader international level, the report
presents and discusses three alternative options—
two that would involve contractual or statutory
changes in major borrowing jurisdictions, and one
involving an IMF-based restructuring mechanism.
The latter envisages endorsement of a sovereign
debtor’s restructuring proposal by both a majority of creditors and the IMF. Following this double
endorsement, the debtor’s assets would become
immune from attachment in the jurisdictions of
IMF members.

Third, the important special case of the euro area
now looms large. This has characteristics that both
aggravate the ex-ante problem and increase the
plausibility of a statutory solution. The close economic, financial and political linkages inside the
euro zone—including, perhaps most important,
the threat that a sovereign default might trigger
a costly exit from the single currency—make the
members of the common currency area much less
willing to risk a failed debt restructuring in their
midst. On top of this, the lack of monetary and exchange rate instruments at the country level makes
it harder for these members to address growth
and competitiveness problems without external
support. For both reasons, the euro zone suffers a
more severe moral hazard problem than, say, the
potential moral hazard caused by IMF crisis lending. This may contribute to mispricing, overborrowing and delays in needed sovereign debt restructuring, as occurred in Greece. At the same
time, because so many areas of economic policy in
the European Union, and particularly in the euro
area, are already governed by common statute, a

4

The report does not discuss two important topics.
First, because it focuses on sovereign debt, it does
not deal with how to unwind or prevent excessive
debts incurred in the private sector.4 However, the
links between these problems and sovereign debt
problems are briefly discussed in the context of
the euro area (chapter 3). The argument is that
while the proposals made in this report will not
by themselves solve private sector debt problems,

S ome of these problems, particularly as pertaining to private debt accumulation fueled by international capital flows, were discussed in last
year’s CIEPR report, Banks and Cross-Border Capital Flows: Policy Challenges and Regulatory Responses (CIEPR 2012).
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they may ameliorate them; markets will be more
likely to “price” sovereign default risks regardless
of whether these originate from sovereign debt or
socialized private debt. This should give incentives
to sovereigns to worry more about credit booms
that could give rise to quasi-fiscal liabilities. While
the proposals in this report and plans to create a
euro area–based Banking Union address different
problems, these problems are linked, and the proposals should be viewed as complementary.

for example, by indexing repayments to gross domestic product (GDP) or commodity prices.5 Although we are sympathetic to these ideas, for the
purposes of the present report we take it as a given
that in spite of periodic calls, bonds with these features do not play an important role in sovereign finance, and are unlikely to play such a role anytime
soon—in part for reasons analyzed in chapter 2.
The focus of this report is on mechanisms that are
plausible today—mechanisms that would allow
for the swift renegotiation of debt under certain
conditions, in ways that not only make crises less
costly but also encourage sovereign debtors and
creditors to act more responsibly in normal times.

Second, we do not discuss a class of ideas that have
broadly similar aims as the proposals in this report, namely, how to prevent sovereign debt crises
through debt contracts with equity-like features,

5

See, e.g., Mody (2013).

R evisiti n g s overeig n ban k ruptcy

4

CHAPTER 2:

Pathologies in Sovereign Debt

A

key feature distinguishing sovereign debt contracts from debt owed by private parties is
weaker contract enforcement. In a sovereign
default, the remedies at the disposal of creditors—
particularly private creditors—are limited by the
fact that most sovereign assets are located within a
sovereign’s jurisdiction and cannot be seized, even
when creditors have won in court (see chapter 3).
In spite of this fact, many sovereigns have historically been able to borrow large amounts of funds.6
How is this possible? Why would private debtors
entrust sovereigns with their money when they
cannot enforce repayment?

generally below the level at which countries would
like to be able to borrow.
It follows that attempts to reduce the costs of default could also reduce welfare because they would
make sovereign debt more expensive and lower the
maximum level of debt that a sovereign can accumulate. Conversely, attempts to improve enforcement could improve welfare even if they make
debt crises more painful and protracted. This logic
has led some researchers to warn that proposals
aimed at reducing the ex-post costs of debt crises
could backfire.8 It is thus important to also examine policy proposals in the area of crisis resolution
from an ex-ante perspective—taking into account
their likely impact on the sovereign debt market in
normal times—rather than simply from the perspective of whether they will reduce the costs of a
crisis once this has happened. The present report
takes this perspective throughout.

Inspired by this puzzle, the modern economic
literature on sovereign debt, which developed in
the 1980s, initially focused on understanding why
sovereign debt ever got repaid. It concluded that
borrowers repay because defaults are economically costly for the debtor country.7 Countries will be
able to borrow up to the point in which the temptation to default is balanced by its costs. In standard theories of sovereign debt, this level of debt is

At the same time, it is important to realize that
in spite of the enforcement problem in sovereign

 ccording to the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (April 2013 edition), general government debt in 2012 stood at about 35 percent of GDP on
A
average in emerging markets and developing countries and over 100 percent of GDP in advanced countries.
7
The contributions include Eaton and Gersovitz (1981); Sachs and Cohen (1982); and Bulow and Rogoff (1989a, 1989b). For surveys of the
literature, see Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer (2009); Wright (2011); Das, Papaioannou, and Trebesch (2012); Tomz and Wright (2013);
and Aguiar and Amador (forthcoming). For evidence on the costs of default, see Mitchener and Weidenmier (2005); Tomz (2007); Borensztein
and Panizza (2009); Sandleris (2012); Tomz and Wright (2013); and Cruces and Trebesch (2013).
8
See Dooley (2000) and Shleifer (2003).
6
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debt, it is logically possible to make crisis resolution more efficient without making debtors countries worse off in normal times. There are two reasons for this:
•

•

ly punished (and as a result, would never occur),
while shocks to debt service capacity would lead
to a corresponding adjustment in the debt burden
without any punishment. In such a world, costly
debt crises would never arise, in spite of the presence of an enforcement problem.

Even if there is a trade-off between ex-ante
incentives to repay and the ex-post costs of
default, this does not mean that this tradeoff cannot be ameliorated. In principle, it
could be possible to improve contracts or
institutions governing sovereign debt in a
way that reduces crisis costs while maintaining incentives to repay.

In the real world, however, debt crises cannot be
neatly separated into excusable defaults driven
by fundamentals and inexcusable repudiations.
Yet there may be institutional or contractual improvements—for example, debt contracts that index repayments to variables such as international
commodity prices—that reduce the frequency or
costs of debt crises. The main insight is that costly
crises are never just a reflection of the enforcement
problem, but also reflect a combination of the enforcement problem with other problems, such as
imperfect information or incomplete contracts.
As such, it may be possible to reduce the costs of
crises through institutions or contracts that legitimize debt restructurings in certain circumstances (which would obviously exclude strategic defaults). This is the flavor of some of the proposals
made in the final chapter of this report.

Furthermore, there could be important
cases in which there is no trade-off between reducing the ex-post costs of crises and improving ex-ante incentives. For
example, the costs of default could be a
result of historic institutions or contracts
that are not optimal in the sense of providing just the right amount of deterrent
to stop creditors from repudiating. Or the
situation might be complicated by incentive problems that go beyond the enforcement problem. Distorted incentives could
drive a wedge between the maximum that
a sovereign can borrow—the borrowing
limit—and what it should be borrowing—
the socially optimal amount of borrowing.
If this were to be the case, reducing the
costs of crises might not have any social
cost ex ante. In fact, for countries that
“overborrow”—in the sense that actual
borrowing is above the socially optimal
amount—tighter borrowing constraints
would improve welfare.

The second point is less well understood, is potentially more controversial, and as such is the main
focus of this chapter. It relates to the existence of
pathologies in sovereign debt that go beyond weak
contract enforcement, and the possibility that
these additional pathologies may be more relevant
as drivers of actual borrowing behavior. These pathologies include political failures, the moral hazard associated with the presence of international
bailouts, and a lack of seniority in sovereign debt
contracts. Together, they could be a source of
overborrowing and suboptimal public debt management. Political considerations and inefficient
contract design may also lead to a situation in
which, rather than defaulting too much and too
early, countries default too late and too little. In
this case, reducing the costs of default will be good
not only ex post—once a crisis has occurred—but

The first point has been understood since at least
the late 1980s.9 Suppose that it were possibly to
write contracts (implicitly or explicitly) or create
institutions so as to make sovereign defaults costly
if and only if they cannot be “excused” by shocks
to fundamentals outside the control of debtor
countries. That is, repudiations would be severe9

See Grossman and Van Huyck (1988).
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also ex ante, by reducing inefficient borrowing in
normal times and making debt crises less likely.

In standard economic theories of sovereign debt,
sovereigns are credit-constrained because their
ability to borrow is capped by a level that depends
on default costs. The typical situation in these
models is “underborrowing,” in the sense that debt
levels are suboptimally low from a social perspective. Specifically, debt levels are lower than what a
country would want to borrow in a world where
debt contracts could be enforced in the same way
as, for example, corporate debt contracts.

government debt levels for three groups of countries that are roughly similar, within each group,
with respect to per capita income levels and (in the
case of the two emerging market groups) geography and trading partners. Of the countries shown,
only two (Greece and Jamaica) do not currently
have access to international capital markets. Of
course, the fact that a country has access to capital
markets does not mean that its debt may not be
primarily determined by its debt limit; these countries may want to stay somewhat below their maximum borrowing in order to have room to respond
to economic shocks. The question is whether the
data pattern observed in figure 1 is consistent with
this notion.

This view of sovereign debt is difficult to reconcile
with actual borrowing behavior, both across countries and over time. Figure 1 shows 2012 general

Figure 1 shows that advanced economies tend
to have higher debt levels than emerging market
countries.10 This is consistent with the view that

Overborrowing

Figure 1. General Government Debt in Three Groups of Countries, 2012 (percentage of GDP)
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Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database, April 2013.

10

 is is true not only for the average of advanced countries and emerging markets selected in figure 1 for illustrative purposes but also more
Th
generally.
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debt levels are determined by repayment prospects;
advanced countries may be able to borrow in larger amounts because they are institutionally better
able to commit to debt repayment, or because they
are less likely to suffer shocks that would put their
debt levels over the limit where debt restructuring is optimal. However, within the three groups,
variations in debt levels (even ignoring Greece
and Jamaica, the two outliers) are so large as to
be irreconcilable with the view that most of these
countries are borrowing at or close to their debt
limits. It is implausible that countries’ differences
in commitment credibility, the location of their assets, their degree of international integration, their
dependence on foreign capital or other factors that
could drive differences in their borrowing limits
could also explain, for example, why Canadian
debt is at 86 percent of GDP while Australian debt
is only 27 percent, why Italy’s debt is 127 percent
of GDP while that of the Netherlands is only 71
percent, why debt is only 19 percent of GDP in
Peru but 45 percent in Argentina and 68 percent
in Brazil, or why debt stands at 19 percent of GDP
in Bulgaria but 37 percent in Romania.

If one accepts the fact that for most advanced and
emerging market economies debt levels are determined not by the maximum amount that these
countries can borrow but instead by policy choices
over time, it is possible, in principle, that countries
may, from a social perspective, be overborrowing
rather than underborrowing—that is, they may be
borrowing beyond the point at which the social
cost of one additional unit of debt equals the social
benefit of an additional unit of debt-financed government expenditure. Overborrowing could arise
from at least three distortions.
First, policymakers often have incentives to borrow more than what is socially optimal (for a recent survey, see Eichengreen et al. 2011). Political
failures can also lead to debt crises through suboptimal debt management. Contingent debt instruments with contractual obligations that are linked
to a country’s ability to pay can help in ensuring
that a government meets its financing needs and
payment obligations at the lowest possible cost
consistent with a prudent degree of risk (Missale
1999). However, self-interested politicians have
limited incentives to issue contingent debt instruments that have upfront costs but may yield benefits for their successors.11

Similar arguments apply over time. Belgium increased its debt level from about 75 percent of
GDP in 1980 to almost 140 percent in 1993 and
subsequently reduced it again to 87 percent in
2007. Over the same period, the French government’s debt more than quadrupled as a share of
GDP, rising more or less continuously, from about
20 percent to about 90 percent. Peru halved its
government debt between 2000 and 2012. So did
Sweden. In all these cases, it is difficult to imagine that these swings were the result of tighter or
laxer sovereign borrowing constraints. It is more
plausible that most of these countries were far
from their borrowing limits during most of their
histories, and that debt levels changed as a result of
policy choices and economic shocks, which affected growth and determined the size of government
deficits and debts.
11

Second, overborrowing might be the result of moral hazard linked to the presence of an international
lender of last resort. Because countries tend to repay what they borrow from official lenders, there
is limited empirical evidence for debtor moral hazard at the expenses of global taxpayers. Creditors,
however, may have incentives to behave recklessly
and lend without adequate regard to risk because
official bailout packages may allow for repayments
that are “too high” with respect to the social optimum. The bill is not footed by global taxpayers
but by local taxpayers who end up repaying, even
when it would have been better to restructure
(Jeanne and Zettelmeyer 2001). Although, in principle, moral hazard can be mitigated by designing

 hile political failures limit the supply of contingent debt instruments, market failures associated with coordination problems limit the
W
demand for such instruments.
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official rescue packages that “bail-in” private creditors, such bail-ins may not be optimal ex post, and
it may be difficult for official lenders to commit to
them ex ante. Official packages can also delay the
moment when a country decides to restructure its
debts (more is given on this below), making creditors willing to provide short-term finance to risky
creditors in the hope of being able to collect before the country defaults or starts the restructuring
process.

This is also true for cross-border, bank-intermediated private credit flows (CIEPR 2012).
In the stereotypical case of overborrowing syndrome, economic reforms and financial liberalization are followed by rapid and unsustainable
capital inflows channeled to the private sector by
domestic banks and fueled by excessive optimism
among residents, foreign investors and policymakers (McKinnon and Pill 1996). A global shock, or
the realization that the inflows are not sustainable,
is often followed by a sudden stop (Calvo 2005),
economic collapse and financial crisis. At this
point, private sector liabilities are transferred to
the sovereign, exacerbating the impact of public
overborrowing during the preceding upswing.

Third, overborrowing could result from the fact
that, in the absence of seniority rules, new lending
to high-risk countries dilutes the claims of existing creditors. Debt dilution can lead to excessive
debt accumulation because the marginal interest
rate does not reflect the increase in risk brought
about the issuance of new debt (Bolton and Jeanne
2007). Countries with prudent fiscal policies face
the opposite problem because the possibility of
diluting the debt increases the risk of lending to
these countries. Debt dilution has also an adverse
effect on debt composition because, in the attempt
to hold debt that is difficult to dilute, lenders will
be reluctant to buy long-term securities or local currency debt instruments (Borensztein et al.
2005).12

As suggested by figure 1, in the advanced economies, the credit constraints associated with enforcement problems are unlikely to be binding at
levels that are sufficiently low to rule out overborrowing. Many advanced economies have been able
to accumulate large public debts, and, until recently, there was no strong relationship between debt
levels and the borrowing costs faced by this group
of countries. This remains true for the advanced
economies that do not belong to the euro area (see
chapter 4).14

Overborrowing requires creditors in the private
or official sector that agree to provide the needed
financing. Overborrowing is often facilitated by
herding behavior, which leads creditors to take on
too much risk during periods of global optimism.13
Though most theoretical models of sovereign debt
suggest that countries should borrow abroad
during recessions and repay during good times,
there is evidence that net lending to emerging
market and developing countries is pro-cyclical,
with large capital inflows during periods of high
growth and outflows during recessions (see Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer 2009, table 2).

In emerging market countries, debt ratios tend to
be lower, and the correlation between borrowing
costs and fundamentals is tighter than in the advanced economies. Low debt ratios are consistent
with the presence of credit constraints associated with limited enforcement. However, a limited
ability and willingness to borrow may also be due
to the fact that emerging market countries have
weaker institutions (Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano 2003), have riskier debt structures (Eichengreen et al. 2005), and face larger external financial
shocks (Calvo 2005).

Dilution accounts for more than 80 percent of the default risk in the baseline calibrated model of Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sosa Padilla (2012).
In the presence of rational herding, investors disregard fundamentals and stand ready to either lend at will when everybody else is lending or to
liquidate good credits when everybody else is also selling (see Allen, Morris, and Shin 2006).
14
For an econometric analysis, see Dell’Erba, Hausmann, and Panizza (2013).
12

13

R evisiti n g s overeig n ban k ruptcy

9

Table 1. Selected Bond Issuances in Frontier Markets
Country

Date

Amount
(millions of dollars)

Currency

Yield
(basis points)

Maturity
(years)

Rating
(S&Pa)

Angola

08/2012

1,000

dollar

700

7

BB-

Bolivia

10/2012

500

dollar

490

10

BB–

Honduras

04/2013

500

dollar

750

10

B+

Mongolia

11/2012

1,000

dollar

512

10

BB–

Mongolia

11/2012

500

dollar

412

5

BB–

Paraguay

01/2013

500

dollar

460

10

BB–

Rwanda

04/2013

400

euro

660

10

B

Tanzania

02/2013

600

dollar

LIBORb + 600

7

NR

Zambia

10/2012

750

dollar

560

10

B+

Memo:
Investment-grade
U.S. corporatesc

2011–13

dollar

450

10–15

Standard & Poor’s.
London Interbank Offered Rate.
c
BofA Merrill Lynch U.S. corporate 10–15 year effective yield.
a

b

Although emerging market countries do face
precarious access to credit, the presence of generalized capital flows bonanzas and sudden stops
suggests that global factors may be a more important determinant of credit constraints than
country-specific considerations linked to capacity and willingness to pay (Calvo, Leiderman, and
Reinhart 1993; González-Rozada and Levy Yeyati
2008). For instance, in a context of historically low
interest rates, investors have been willing to take
greater risks to achieve returns. This “search for
yield” allowed low-rated frontier markets to issue
international bonds with low spreads compared
with higher-rated instruments issued by traditional borrowers (table 1).

ness to pay. Its capacity to pay is reduced because
procrastination prolongs the climate of uncertainty, high interest rates and restrictive fiscal policies
that are ineffective in avoiding default but amplify
output contractions. Delayed defaults reduce its
willingness to pay because electors that have suffered long periods of economic austerity are less
likely to support a creditor-friendly debt restructuring.
Because policymakers are often replaced after a
debt default (figure 2), late restructurings may be
caused by self-interested agents that have incentives to gamble for redemption, even when delays
entail economic costs for society as a whole. Myopic policymakers who do not take into account
the long-run costs of excessive debt accumulation
may also decide to delay a default in order to have
continuous access to external resources. Short political horizons may also create incentives to undertake policies that increase the vulnerability of
the financial sector to government default. This
generates short-term benefits in terms of a higher capacity to borrow, but at the expense of higher
future default costs if the accumulated debt turns
out to be unsustainable (Acharya and Rajan 2013).

Restructuring Too Late
There is evidence that policymakers are often reluctant to restructure their debts and suboptimally
postpone unavoidable defaults (e.g., Borensztein
and Panizza 2009; Levy Yeyati and Panizza 2010;
IMF 2013). Delayed defaults can lead to the destruction of value because a prolonged predefault
crisis may reduce a country’s capacity and willing-
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debt situations.15 A willingness to provide official
financing to countries that face an unsustainable
situation is sometimes driven by private creditors’
lobbying, especially if the restructuring could lead
to large losses for banks located in official lenders’
countries, or due to the fear that a restructuring
would trigger global market turmoil (IMF 2013).

Figure 2. The Probability of Replacing the
Minister of Finance Given Various Events
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%

Restructuring Too Little

20%
15%

In the late 1990s, it was feared that the process of
debt securitization sparked by the Brady exchanges would amplify creditors’ coordination problems
and lead to long and litigious negotiations. However, by and large (Argentina’s 2005 restructuring is a
notable exception; see the next section), these fears
did not materialize. The duration of the average
default episodes is now much shorter than in the
1980s (Inter-American Development Bank 2006;
Bi, Chamon, and Zettelmeyer 2011; Trebesch 2013).

10%
5%
0%

Tranquil years

After Bank
Loan Defaults

After Bond
Defaults

Source: Borensztein and Panizza (2009, table 11).

Alternatively, policymakers who believe that “strategic” defaults can have large reputational costs
but that “unavoidable” defaults carry limited costs
in terms of reputation may decide to postpone a
needed default in order to signal that the default
is indeed unavoidable. Finally, policymakers may
delay necessary defaults because, in the absence
of a clear mechanism to manage the restructuring
process, they overstate the actual costs of default.

Quick debt restructurings with attractive offers,
however, can lead to insufficient debt reduction
and may not restore debt sustainability. The current system may thus generate two, equally bad,
equilibria (Powell 2011). In the first equilibrium,
countries implement quick and creditor-friendly restructurings but do not solve their debt-sustainability problem. The second equilibrium can
deliver larger debt relief at the cost of long negotiations and protracted litigation. Evidence showing
a positive relationship between haircuts (i.e., the
losses faced by bondholders during debt restructuring episodes) and the duration of restructuring
episodes (figure 3) and the bimodal distribution of
haircuts (figure 4) is consistent with such a view
(Powell 2012).

The IMF (2013) describes several episodes in
which a country decided to initiate a restructuring
process years after IMF staff had judged the debt
situation to be unsustainable. In the majority of
these cases, the countries decided to restructure
and approach the International Monetary Fund
only when they lost market access. There are, however, also cases in which delays were facilitated
by official sector financing to countries that had
lost market access and were facing unsustainable
15

 reece is an example. According to the IMF’s (2013, 20) own assessment: “The case of Greece is also illustrative of the difficulty of introducing
G
early debt restructuring. Even in the face of a sustained loss of market access, debt restructuring could be delayed because of the ample
availability of official financing and the authorities’ stated willingness to entertain an unprecedented program of fiscal adjustment. Even under
these supportive conditions, however, it was not possible to establish that there was a high probability of debt sustainability as required by the
exceptional access policy. The chosen course was therefore to amend the policy to create an exception to the requirement of “high probability”
in circumstances where “there is a high risk of international systemic spillovers.” Eventually, the planned adjustment proved unfeasible and,
despite additional official sector financing on supportive terms, private debt restructuring became unavoidable and was launched in February
2012.” There have been, however, also cases in which official financing and adjustments have been successful in restoring debt sustainability
while avoiding a full-fledged debt restructuring. Turkey in the early 2000s is an example of a situation in which official financing was successful
in addressing a nearly unsustainable debt situation (IMF 2013).
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Political distortions can amplify these problems.
Myopic policymakers who want to quickly access
the international capital market and do not internalize the costs of future defaults may decide to
advocate the implementation of quick and creditor-friendly restructurings. Equally myopic policymakers who do not need access to the international capital market may instead decide to be
excessively tough with their creditors and hurt the
country’s international reputation.

restore debt sustainability, required prolonged official support and led to additional restructurings.16
Problems associated with suboptimal haircuts are
amplified by the fact that haircuts and debt relief
are different concepts. Haircuts are usually calculated by comparing the present value of old and
new debts obtained by discounting future payments with the exit yield (i.e., the interest rate faced
by the country when it completes the restructuring process).17 However, countries should evaluate their debts by using the interest rate that they
expect to prevail in noncrisis times. Sturzenegger
and Zettelmeyer (2007) apply this idea to a series
of debt restructuring episodes that took place between 1998 and 2003 and show that the debt relief of these restructuring episodes is significantly
smaller than the losses suffered by investors.

The official sector sometimes serves to exacerbate
the problem through some bias stemming from
myopia or overoptimism. Some of the restructuring
episodes described by the IMF (2013) were based
on overoptimistic debt sustainability assessments,
with relatively small face-value haircuts that did not

Figure 3. The Longer the Restructuring Negotiations, the Heavier the Haircut
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Note: HIPC = Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative.
Sources: Powell, Sandleris, and Tavella (2013); Tavella (2013).

 owever, there are also a few cases in which restructurings exercised that were deemed to be too timid ended up being successful in restoring
H
debt sustainability. One example is Uruguay’s 2003 debt restructuring that, according to a 2006 assessment, was deemed to have left significant
debt vulnerabilities (IMF 2006).
17
Formally: Hsz= 1 – Present Value New Debt (r) / Present Value Old Debt (r), where r is the exit yield.
16
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debt situations.15 A willingness to provide official
financing to countries that face an unsustainable
situation is sometimes driven by private creditors’
lobbying, especially if the restructuring could lead
to large losses for banks located in official lenders’
countries, or due to the fear that a restructuring
would trigger global market turmoil (IMF 2013).
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Alternatively, policymakers who believe that “strategic” defaults can have large reputational costs
but that “unavoidable” defaults carry limited costs
in terms of reputation may decide to postpone a
needed default in order to signal that the default
is indeed unavoidable. Finally, policymakers may
delay necessary defaults because, in the absence
of a clear mechanism to manage the restructuring
process, they overstate the actual costs of default.

Quick debt restructurings with attractive offers,
however, can lead to insufficient debt reduction
and may not restore debt sustainability. The current system may thus generate two, equally bad,
equilibria (Powell 2011). In the first equilibrium,
countries implement quick and creditor-friendly restructurings but do not solve their debt-sustainability problem. The second equilibrium can
deliver larger debt relief at the cost of long negotiations and protracted litigation. Evidence showing
a positive relationship between haircuts (i.e., the
losses faced by bondholders during debt restructuring episodes) and the duration of restructuring
episodes (figure 3) and the bimodal distribution of
haircuts (figure 4) is consistent with such a view
(Powell 2012).

The IMF (2013) describes several episodes in
which a country decided to initiate a restructuring
process years after IMF staff had judged the debt
situation to be unsustainable. In the majority of
these cases, the countries decided to restructure
and approach the International Monetary Fund
only when they lost market access. There are, however, also cases in which delays were facilitated
by official sector financing to countries that had
lost market access and were facing unsustainable
15

 reece is an example. According to the IMF’s (2013, 20) own assessment: “The case of Greece is also illustrative of the difficulty of introducing
G
early debt restructuring. Even in the face of a sustained loss of market access, debt restructuring could be delayed because of the ample
availability of official financing and the authorities’ stated willingness to entertain an unprecedented program of fiscal adjustment. Even under
these supportive conditions, however, it was not possible to establish that there was a high probability of debt sustainability as required by the
exceptional access policy. The chosen course was therefore to amend the policy to create an exception to the requirement of “high probability”
in circumstances where “there is a high risk of international systemic spillovers.” Eventually, the planned adjustment proved unfeasible and,
despite additional official sector financing on supportive terms, private debt restructuring became unavoidable and was launched in February
2012.” There have been, however, also cases in which official financing and adjustments have been successful in restoring debt sustainability
while avoiding a full-fledged debt restructuring. Turkey in the early 2000s is an example of a situation in which official financing was successful
in addressing a nearly unsustainable debt situation (IMF 2013).
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Figure 4. Haircuts Seem to Have a Bimodal Distribution
0.016
0.014

Density

0.012
0.01
0.008
0.006
0.004
0.002
0
-20%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

Haircut
Source: Powell (2012).

Prophylaxis

•

A system that guarantees speedy and
transparent debt restructurings can also
reduce the overborrowing associated with
creditor moral hazard because it allows
the international financial institutions to
resist pressure to lend to countries that
face sustainability problems. This will be
particularly true if the restructuring process is combined with a clear set of rules
that allows for exceptional financing to
countries that face liquidity problems but
prevent official lenders from providing
funds to countries that face an unsustainable debt situation.

•

A sovereign debt restructuring framework
could also have positive effects on debt composition. Reforms that reduce moral hazard
and lead to more careful country-specific
risk assessment may provide policymakers
with incentives to issue “safer”—from the

If the pathologies described above dominate the
classic enforcement problem, a reform that facilitates the debt restructuring process, strengthens
incentives for evaluating credit risk, and reduces
procrastination could be efficient both ex post and
ex ante:
•

18

If easier debt restructuring bolsters incentives to carefully assess country risk,
a reform in this direction will increase
borrowing costs for countries with unsustainable policies and reduce their ability to
accumulate excessive debts. Conversely, a
smoother debt restructuring process may
benefit (or at least not harm) countries
that do not overborrow because, in the
case of a large negative shock, investors
are likely to obtain higher recovery values
(Rogoff 2003).18

 possible caveat is that, in the presence of uncertainty (or other market imperfections), creditors may reduce lending flows to countries with a
A
fully sustainable debt situation.
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point of view of the issuer—debt instruments. Enforceable seniority rules that address debt dilution problems may reduce
overborrowing and increase investors’
willingness to hold such instruments.

that require a substantial amount of trust among
the counterparties (Cole and Kehoe 1998).20 If
such reputational costs are large enough, the country’s willingness to pay will be maintained even in
the presence of an (ex-post) efficient debt restructuring mechanism. Indeed, a sovereign debt court
able to assess ability to pay could create willingness to pay by increasing the reputational costs of
strategic defaults and mitigate the delayed default
problems by reducing the reputational costs of unavoidable defaults.

Although marginal improvements to the debt
workout process are unlikely to result in inefficiencies ex ante,19 it is possible that reform designed
to facilitate sovereign debt restructuring could
overshoot and, by reducing a country’s willingness
to pay, raise the borrowing costs of solvent sovereigns. However, the chances that this might happen are contained by the fact that willingness to
pay is sustained by the economic costs of default,
which are not directly affected by the debt restructuring regime. Besides the political costs of default
mentioned above, a large literature suggests that
defaults inflict broad “collateral damage” on the
debtor country. Defaults may have a negative effect on the country’s overall reputation (not just its
reputation vis-à-vis its creditors) and increase the
costs of all its transactions and agreements (economic and political, domestic and international)

To conclude, there are multiple ex-ante problems
associated with sovereign debt, and these problems in principle could be reduced through a sovereign bankruptcy procedure, without necessarily
exacerbating the enforcement problem. This said,
the design of complex mechanisms that can deal
with several inefficiencies at once is rife with difficulties and would require significant information
and commitment capacity. The last chapter of this
report discusses whether such mechanisms might
be legally and politically feasible.

 or evidence showing that collective action clauses do not significantly increase borrowing costs for most issuers, see Eichengreen and Portes
F
(1995); Eichengreen and Mody (2000); and Bradley and Gulati (2012).
20
An alternative class of models suggests that sovereign defaults may have large economic costs because they reveal negative information on the
underlying structure of the economy (Sandleris 2008; Catão, Fostel, and Kapur 2007).
19
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CHAPTER 3:

A rgentina and the Rebirth of the
Holdout Problem
bankruptcy, sovereign debt cannot be discharged
to give the country a fresh start. In most cases, a
determined creditor insisting on full repayment
cannot be forced to restructure its bonds. At the
same time, the combination of immunity and
transactional technique that shields debtors from
enforcement is imperfect. It relies on diverse national laws and contract provisions. When creditors try to attach external payment flows, the effectiveness of immunity as a shield depends on
individual sovereigns’ capacity to litigate and survive the loss of market access for potentially long
stretches of time. This implies that creditors with
the time, will and resources to pursue a country to
the ends of the Earth can try to make life difficult
for it in perpetuity, throwing obstacles in the way
of its international trade and financial activity.

A Fundamental Tension
From a legal perspective, there are two noteworthy distinctions between corporate and sovereign
debt. First, as already discussed, sovereign debt is
mostly unenforceable. This is because sovereign
immunity shields most public assets from creditors, even if they win a judgment against a defaulting government.21 The debtor’s property is either
inside its own national borders (where the courts
are loath to side with creditors against their own
government), or enjoys the special protections that
are provided for embassies, central bank funds,
military installations and the like. Property used
for commercial activity is more accessible, but
since the wave of privatizations in the late 20th
century, few governments have conducted much
commercial business in their own name. Although
sovereigns often waive immunities when they borrow abroad, courts sometimes interpret general
waivers narrowly or even ignore them. Where the
legal scope for enforcement is so limited, political
pressures play an outsize role, adding to uncertainty about the outcome of any given case.

Arguably, the balance between these fundamental characteristics of sovereign debt—the fact that
enforcement is difficult and unpredictable, but
not absent altogether; and the fact that sovereigns
cannot get a fresh start—has made orderly debt
restructurings possible in the new era of bonded
debt. Faced with the alternatives of accepting a
reasonable take-it-or-leave-it debt exchange offer
or the hard work and uncertainty of enforcement,

Second, although sovereign debt contracts are
hard to enforce, they also last forever. Without

21

E.g., see Weidemaier (forthcoming).
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most creditors will accept the offer, particularly
when the litigation prospects and secondary market values of defaulted instruments are further
eroded by restructuring techniques (Bi, Chamon,
and Zettelmeyer 2011). This calculus may not apply to specialized distressed debt funds—expert
litigators—that have the patience, skill and deep
pockets to exploit the loopholes in sovereign immunity—provided the sovereign’s overall debt
stock is reduced to make side payments possible.
Sovereigns, in turn, will understand that in the
presence of these loopholes, and given the nondischargeability of debt, holdouts can be a permanent source of irritation and disruption. As a result, they will typically settle, and sometimes repay
holdouts in full.

to the cartoonish. However, recent rulings in New
York may give creditors the first broadly replicable
remedy against sovereign debtors since the days of
gunboat diplomacy a century ago (box 1). Relying on the “pari passu” clause in Argentina’s fiscal
agency agreement, a group of holdouts secured an
order that bars Argentina from making payments
on its restructured debt unless it pays holdouts
proportionately (“ratably”). Under court orders,
if the new bondholders get paid in full under the
restructured contracts, holdouts are entitled to full
payment under their original contracts.
Because versions of the pari passu clause are present in all sovereign bonds, the ratable payment
order in New York has given creditors a way to intercept flows from a wide range of sovereigns to
firms and official institutions. For the first time in
decades, sovereign debt enforcement looks like a
much more realistic prospect in a major financial
jurisdiction. This is because cross-border payment
flows remain ubiquitous and essential for most
sovereigns. The pari passu remedy operates by inflicting collateral damage; that is, those creditors
under performing debt contracts are blocked from
receiving their payments, and payment and clearing systems and trustees are threatened with contempt of court if they help the debtor pay its performing bonds.22 This forces the debtor to choose
between repaying holdouts in full and defaulting
on creditors within the reach of U.S. courts. The
latter, in turn, would imply a loss of access to large
segments of the international market, along with
possibly interfering with trade-related payments.

Since the revival of the sovereign bond market in
the 1990s, the fundamental tension between the
lack of enforcement and the lack of a fresh start
has produced a regime where few creditors hold
out. Those that do hold out do not fundamentally disrupt the restructuring process. With very
few exceptions—most notably Argentina, where
the authorities took a confrontational stance with
creditors, largely for reasons of domestic political
economy—all debt exchanges since the return of
the emerging markets’ sovereign bond market in
the early 1990s have conformed to this pattern. As
we argued in the previous section, some of these
debt exchanges did not go far enough in reducing debt burdens. But they certainly constituted
a “technology” for debt restructuring that minimized litigation and exclusion from sovereign debt
markets.

In a world of well-coordinated creditors, giving
creditors a powerful new enforcement tool might
improve welfare. Creditors would enforce debt repayment when it is in their collective interest to do
so. This would rule out “rogue debtor” behavior—
that is, instances when countries repudiate their

The Return of the Holdout
Those creditors that refused Argentina’s restructuring offers have been chasing it around the globe
since 2001, using tactics that range from the exotic

22

 lthough the creditors said that they were not trying to block payments to the IMF, the terms of the court orders appear to cover private and
A
official payments in equal measure.
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Box 1. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina
Argentina defaulted on more than $80 billion in foreign bonds in 2001. Two debt exchanges and over a
decade later, it has restructured 93 percent of this total. NML Capital, Ltd., is among the creditors that
rejected Argentina’s offers and sued for full payment. NML is an affiliate of Elliott Associates, which
specializes in distressed sovereign debt litigation. Elliott’s successful lawsuit against Peru a decade earlier, on the same theory it has since used against Argentina, was prominently cited to support SDRM.
Unlike Peru, Argentina has refused to settle with the holdouts, and it has chosen instead to pay the
cost of moving its assets beyond its creditors’ reach and to avoid new borrowing abroad, for fear of
attachment.
By 2012, both the creditors and the courts were ready to escalate debt enforcement. In February, the
U.S. federal judge in New York, who has presided over Argentina’s debt litigation all these years, ruled
that it had violated the pari passu clause in its old bonds with its protracted failure to pay, by enacting
laws that impede settlement, and by making official statements of defiance—among other things. The
court required Argentina to pay both its old and new bonds “ratably.” The court later elaborated that
ratable payments meant that Argentina must pay NML and its co-plaintiffs full principal and pastdue interest (now $1.4 billion) whenever it makes the periodic coupon payment on the restructured
bonds. The judge prohibited Argentina from rerouting payments on the new bonds, and threatened to
sanction third parties that might help Argentina pay this debt but not NML. The threat covers trustees, clearinghouses and payment systems, even naming some located in Belgium, Luxembourg and
the United Kingdom. The court effectively gave Argentina only two ways to comply: pay everyone, or
default on everyone.
In October 2012, the U.S. Federal Appeals Court for the Second Circuit agreed that Argentina had
violated the pari passu clause and must make ratable payments. It dismissed the U.S. executive branch’s
objections to the lower court’s contract interpretation, its warnings that the remedy would impede
future restructurings, and its claim that the court had violated the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act by telling Argentina how to spend its treasury funds anywhere in the world.
In August 2013, the Second Circuit also affirmed the lower court’s formula for ratable payment, and
refused to limit up front the injunction’s territorial reach, or its potential impact on third parties. The
court was unpersuaded by the many submissions from the exchange bondholders and financial institutions potentially subject to sanctions. However, the injunction remains stayed (suspended) for now,
to allow appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court. The stay may be at risk in the wake of Argentina’s recent
announcement that it would offer to swap its restructured New York bonds for domestic debt with
payment streams beyond the reach of U.S. courts.
Argentina appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court in June 2013, asking it to review the holding that it may
not service its new bonds unless it pays the plaintiffs ratably. France has filed a friend-of-the-court brief
urging review, and stressing the consequences for debt restructuring and the Paris Club. In light of the
August 2013 court decision, Argentina and other countries are likely to make other submissions to the
Supreme Court. The Court is also likely to ask the U.S. government for its views.

R evisiti n g s overeig n ban k ruptcy

17

debts or offer creditors a debt restructuring well
below their capacity to pay. These have been rare
in sovereign debt since World War II, much rarer
than the opposite problem of overindebted countries that restructure too little too late, as argued
in the previous chapter; however, ruling out rogue
behavior entirely surely would be good news, particularly from the perspective of new borrowers
with short track records. If, conversely, a debtor
is genuinely unable to pay—or debt is inefficiently
high, creating a debt overhang problem that weighs
on growth and future capacity to pay—creditors
could collectively agree to renegotiate debt contracts. Debtors would be discharged of past debt
obligations through a change in the contract terms
of each and every existing debt obligation.

optimal, or they could result in much lighter haircuts than would be needed to restore debt sustainability. The country and most of its creditors, and
perhaps even its neighbors and other victims of
spillovers, could risk getting permanently stuck in
debt purgatory.

No Easy Way Out
The opinions of the U.S. Court of Appeals mistakenly suggest that the court follows on the heels of a
major shift in sovereign debt contracts that facilitates restructuring—the advent of collective action
clauses (CACs)—which creates the space for more
robust enforcement. In this view, the rise of CACs
gets the debtor closer to a fresh start and justifies
“rebalancing” in the direction of enforcement.
However, whereas CACs can be helpful, they do
not—at least in the variety that is most common
in sovereign debt contracts today—eliminate holdouts in sovereign debt restructuring so as to make
the pari passu remedy unimportant. Under the prevailing model of CACs, a supermajority of creditors
in a single bond series may vote to amend the terms
and bind the dissenting minority. However, creditors can and do target small series trading at a deep
discount, where they can buy a blocking position
with relative ease, hold out, and threaten to sue. For
instance, more than half of all foreign-law bonds in
the Greek debt restructuring failed to get the needed votes to amend the terms. These bonds are still
being serviced according to the original terms.

In the absence of effective creditor coordination,
however, the New York decisions could turn out
to be a big problem. This is because they are likely to upset the delicate balance between imperfect
enforcement and the nondischargeability of debt
that has made ad hoc debt exchanges reasonably
smooth in the past. Though sovereign debt remains
nondischargeable, potential holdouts have been
handed a much better enforcement technique than
they had in the past: “third party enforcement” directed not at the sovereign itself but at those private
parties on which the sovereign depends.
This will make successful debt exchanges harder to
coordinate, even when they are in the joint interests
of the debtor country and the creditors collectively. On one hand, the bargaining power of potential
holdouts will be higher, making holdout strategies
a more attractive proposition. One the other hand,
creditors considering an exchange offer must weigh
not only the proposed haircut but also the prospect
of defending a lawsuit or, at a minimum, having
their reduced payments interrupted by future holdouts. This means that even where litigation is unattractive to most creditors, participation is likely to
become much less attractive.

Could exit consents offer a solution? Since Ecuador’s 2000 restructuring, this has been a popular
technique to deter holdouts in sovereign restructuring. When participating creditors exchange
their old bonds for new ones, they are asked to
vote to amend certain nonfinancial terms of the
bond that may be altered by simple majority, with
the result binding on all. In the early days of the
tactic, it could be used to strip out a bond’s terms
concerning negative pledge, pari passu, listing, immunity and jurisdiction. Nonparticipants risked
staying behind with an illiquid and potentially

As a result, exchange offers could fail for lack of
participation even when they were collectively
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Box 2. The Assenagon Case
CACs and exit consents both rely on majority rule. When a technique empowers a majority of bondholders to impose restructuring terms on dissenters, it raises the possibility of unfair treatment. Such
fairness concerns have featured most prominently in U.K. court cases about the oppression of bondholder minorities. Taken to the extreme, this line of reasoning can block or severely limit the use of
CACs and exit consents, and breathe new life into holdout strategies.
The High Court decision in Assenagon Asset Management S.A. and Irish Bank Resolution Corporation
Limited (Formerly Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Limited) involved the use of exit consents in an Irish
bank’s restructuring and recapitalization exercise. Holders of Anglo-Irish bank bonds were invited to
exchange their holdings for new ones at 20 cents on the euro. At the same time, they were asked to vote
to give the Irish Bank Restructuring Corporation, which had taken over the bank, the right to redeem
nonparticipating bonds at 1 cent on €1,000, effectively wiping out their value. The High Court deemed
this oppressive and ruled for the fund challenging the transaction.
The judge appeared amenable to a softer version of exit consents, whereby nonparticipants are given
value equivalent to that received by the participants. However, when the worst possible outcome for
nonparticipation is getting the same terms as everyone else, the urgency of signing up for an exchange
goes away.

worthless instrument. However, since the advent
of CACs on a mass scale in 2003, important nonfinancial terms in sovereign bonds have generally
migrated to the list of reserve matters that require
supermajority amendment, along with financial
terms. This means that blocking the removal of
a pari passu clause through exit consents is now
just as easy as blocking the change in the payment
terms itself. In addition, a U.K. court’s decision in
2012 potentially limits the use of exit consents in
distressed exchanges (box 2).

decisions. By treating all creditors the same, this
approach would sidestep the possibility of enforcement. But this comes at a high price, given that the
debtor would plunge into a torrent of litigation
and likely forgo any hope of a fresh start.

Pari Passu Is Not All
Even in the absence of legal and institutional reforms along the lines proposed in this report, the
pari passu problem may well recede over the next
decade or so (though only very gradually, given the
typical maturities of sovereign bonds). Sovereigns
and their creditors, including major trade associations, have adapted their contracts in response to
litigation and other restructuring developments.
There is some evidence that this adaptation process has already begun in response to New York
court rulings. Hence, although recent legal developments are likely to pose problems for debt restructuring in the short and medium terms, their
effect is likely to diminish over time.

This seems to leave only one approach to ad hoc
debt restructuring that could avoid the new threat
of third-part enforcement, albeit at a much higher
risk of litigation by “mainstream” creditors. Rather
than offering a debt exchange that would create incentives to hold out, debtors could simply default
“ratably” on all creditors at once. For example, a
debtor could announce a new payment stream
equivalent to that which it would have offered in
the form of a new debt preceding the New York
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However, this fact obscures a more significant
structural problem, of which the pari passu saga
is a symptom. With no clear path to enforcement
or a fresh start, both sides in the sovereign debt
restructuring game try to leverage contract provisions to win a given round. As the pari passu clause
is gradually replaced, another technique will likely
surface as a platform for recovery. All it will take
is for one adventurous (or frustrated) court to interpret a contract term in an unconventional way
for a brief period of time. In the next round, sovereigns might respond with more aggressive restructuring techniques. The same contractual flexibility
that produces ingenious restructuring techniques
lends itself to ingenious enforcement techniques,
and so on.

tween the lack of enforcement and the impossibility of discharge in sovereign debt. To the extent that
contracts improve over time and leave less room
for interpretation, this problem may recede. That
said, experience suggests that this is at best an uncertain process that will take several decades—adaptation is a long and winding road littered with
institutional problems, and is not at all certain to
address interpretive shocks or result in more perfect contracts (Gulati and Scott 2013). Hence, a
solution that is both durable and takes effects reasonably quickly will require policy action—whether to improve contracts in a more radical and coordinated fashion than adaptation would produce
on its own, or to create statutory solutions that can
complement existing contracts.

Put differently, contracts as interpreted by judges
have proven inadequate to mediate the tension be-
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CHAPTER 4:

Euro Area Issues

gether in quite the same way as within the euro
area. Apart from a shared and often difficult history that rarely leaves room for indifference, what
sets the euro area apart from other highly integrated areas is that the common currency itself constitutes a powerful channel that links economic
outcomes among its members. This is partly because the policies of the European Central Bank
(ECB) affect the entire currency area, but most of
all because of the threat of a collapse of the common currency, and the associated disruptions that
this would create across the currency area. As a result, a disorderly default in one part of the currency union could have massive implications for its
other members—even members whose direct exposures to the afflicted country are not very high.

Euro Pathologies
Although some of the pathologies related to
overborrowing and delayed restructuring that
were described in chapter 2 can be illustrated using euro area experiences (particularly the case of
Greece), they have been well known in emerging
market settings for some time. This said, the euro
area does appear to be special in ways implying
that the general case for an overhaul of the rules
governing debt restructuring—and particularly
for a treaty-based mechanism—may apply with
special force. In particular, the euro area embodies two structural features that exacerbate both the
ex-ante pathologies described in chapter 2 and the
difficulties of managing debt crises ex post, particularly in combination.

Second, euro area countries have fewer policy instruments for dealing with high debt. In particular,
unless the euro area as a whole has a debt problem
that is symmetrical across most members of the
currency union, the area’s member countries cannot count on devaluation or accommodative monetary policy to offset the contractionary impact
of fiscal adjustment. As a result, debt reduction
efforts are economically and socially more costly
for given debt and deficit levels, and debt sustainability problems arise at lower levels of debt than
in comparable countries with their own monetary
authorities.

First, a debt crisis afflicting one country in the euro
area constitutes a common problem for the entire
currency area, to a degree that dwarfs crisis-related
spillovers anywhere else in the world. This is partly
the result of close trade and financial linkages—
including through holdings of sovereign debt by
banking groups and other institutional investors
with cross-border presence. However, economic
linkages are also very high—for example, between
the U.S. and Canada, between the U.K. and some
euro area countries, and between Germany and
Switzerland—without tying these countries to-
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Note that the second problem—a lack of monetary
policy instruments to help deal with high debt—is
by no means unique to the euro area. It is, in fact,
almost identical to the standard problem arising
from foreign currency borrowing that has afflicted
emerging market economies for many decades. Just
as in the euro area, the presence of foreign currency
debt renders standard monetary policy instruments
essentially useless in a crisis, and implies that crises
can be self-fulfilling.23 What is special about the euro
area, however, is the combination of a lack of instruments to deal with debt crises in individual countries and the fact that, if these debt crises spin out
of control, there could be dire consequences for the
entire common currency area. As a result, the need
both for a regime that prevents the emergence of
debt problems and for additional policy instruments
to handle debt crises when they do occur has been
much more urgent in the euro area than elsewhere.

At the same time, large-scale crisis lending can
give rise to moral hazard, at two levels: at the expense of the European taxpayer if official loans
themselves have to be written down—as seems
likely when lending occurs in unsustainable debt
cases—but also at the expense of the domestic taxpayer, who is required to repay official loans that
are being used to service debts to private creditors. The consequences are underpricing of debt
and overborrowing, particularly in countries with
weaker institutions and political systems that are
not fully responsive to taxpayer interests.
Fortunately, the euro area is special not only with
respect to its problems in preventing and containing debt crises but also in its potential to establish
common institutions or legal frameworks to create
new solutions. Euro area members are of course
also members of the EU, which has had a long, and
for the most part successful, record of cooperating
through supranational legal frameworks and institutions. Furthermore, the euro area has one particular specific institution—the ESM, created by
treaty in 2012—that could be easily adapted to embed a treaty-based debt restructuring regime. The
next chapter hence explores the possibility of an
amendment of the ESM treaty that would attempt
to impart incentives for better debt management
ex ante, bestow legitimacy on debt restructuring
when this is in the common interest, and deal with
the legal obstacles to debt restructurings posed by
holdouts.

So far, these “additional policy instruments” have
consisted mainly in the combination of fiscal adjustment and large-scale, conditional official support (either through the European Financial Stability Facility / ESM or the ECB’s “Outright Monetary Transactions” program). Though these forms
of support can stop self-fulfilling debt crises when
debt is in principle sustainable, by definition they
do not work in unsustainable debt cases. But because official support and fiscal adjustment are the
only instruments on the table, the existing regime
creates an incentive to misdiagnose debt problems—declaring the unsustainable sustainable—
and to stigmatize those that disagree. Before the
Greek debt restructuring finally became the official
policy of the European Union in the second half
of 2011, even the discussion of debt restructuring
in Europe was effectively branded as un-European by influential policymakers.24 In turn, this can
result in adjustment burdens that ultimately prove
unfeasible, but usually not until they have caused
great social and political harm.
23
24

Before going down this route, however, it is necessary to address four possible objections, all of
which are specific to the euro area context:
•

First, does the diagnosis change if one takes
into account the nexus between public and
private debt—including overlending by
banks? In light of this nexus, might the
creation of a euro area–based Banking

See Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2003), and the references therein.
Nicolas Sarkozy, “We Will Show That Europeans Pay Their Debts,” International Financing Review, December 10, 2011. Similar statements were
made by ECB officials, particularly Lorenzo Bini Smaghi; see “Private Sector Involvement: From (Good) Theory to (Bad) Practice,” Berlin, June
6, 2011, http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2011/html/sp110606.en.html.
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Union—with a common fiscal backstop—
be sufficient to deal with sovereign debt
problems in Europe?
•

•

•

down in interbank lending triggered by the subprime
crisis in the United States.25 With few exceptions—
chiefly, the problems of Greece—sovereign debt
problems in the euro area have been a consequence,
rather than the cause, of this broader crisis.

Second, was the Greek debt restructuring a game-changer in the sense that it
demonstrated the feasibility of orderly
debt restructuring in the euro area? In
light of this success, does the euro area still
need a more formal restructuring regime?
Or does the Greek restructuring solve the
problem both ex ante, by sending a warning to future reckless sovereign borrowers and lenders, and ex post, by creating
a template for future restructurings in the
euro area, should they become necessary?

In the context of the discussion so far, this raises
several questions. If the main problem in Europe
was (and to some extent still is) privately held debt,
does the emphasis on sovereign debt restructuring
miss the point? Even worse, might a sovereign
debt restructuring regime be rendered ineffectual
by the tight link between private and public debt?
And to the extent that this link is at the core of the
sovereign debt problem in Europe, would it not be
addressed by the Banking Union that Europe has
begun to build, obviating the need for a sovereign
restructuring regime?

Third, could the problem be solved by the
“aggregated” collective action clauses that,
since early 2013, have begun to be incorporated into the newly issued sovereign
bonds of all euro area members? Do these
CACs already constitute a restructuring
regime of sorts that might obviate the need
for a more heavy-handed alternative?

The first and most obvious answer to these points
is that although public and private debt are related
for the usual reasons—because private overborrowing can become public in a banking crisis, and
but also because public overborrowing can crowd
out private borrowing—they are still separate
problems in the sense that they are driven by distinct moral hazard problems, each of which would
continue to pose a threat if the other were eliminated. In particular, even if new financial sector
institutions and macroprudential policies were to
eliminate any chance of unsalutary private credit
booms in Europe, a potential public overborrowing problem would remain, for the reasons described in chapter 2, and would be particularly
important to address in the euro area. For the reasons described earlier in this chapter—the lack of
country-level monetary policy instruments, larger
mutual costs of debt crises, and moral hazard—
prudent sovereign debt levels in a currency union
of closely integrated economies should probably
be lower than elsewhere. This may require a supranational debt restructuring framework to both set

Fourth and finally, could the recent reforms of the European fiscal framework
make a debt restructuring regime redundant? Should not the new rules and
strengthened oversight suffice to ensure
fiscal discipline and to curb moral hazard?
Also, ESM funding is already conditional
on fulfilling the fiscal targets, so why is
there a need to go any further?

Banking Union and the Nexus
between Private and Public Debt
It has often been pointed out that the euro area crisis
was primarily caused by capital flows and bank credit
directed mainly at private rather than public borrowers, together with the higher risk premia and break-

25

S ee, e.g., Lane (2012); Lane and Pels (2012); Shambaugh (2012); Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2012); and Hughes Hallett and Martinez Oliva
(2013).
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the right incentives and deal with large accidents.
The presence of such a framework does not, of
course, obviate the need to also improve financial
sector supervision and resolution, both because of
the disruptiveness of crises caused by private credit booms and to prevent private debt from becoming a public liability.

shocks—regardless of whether their origin lies in
the public or private sector. Second, one in which
both supervision and resolution are joint, and
there is both a common backstop and a sovereign
debt restructuring regime.
In a financial area with cross-border banking, the
latter is preferable because it internalizes the multicountry effects both of banking in normal times
and of bank resolutions. But it will work only if the
authorities whose decisions ultimately influence
the quality of bank assets have the right incentives.
With major decision areas—for example, influencing housing markets—remaining at the national
level even in a perfect Banking Union, this requires that national authorities retain “skin in the
game,” in the sense that national fiscal backstops, if
required in the resolution process, are tapped before common euro area–level backstops. This, in
turn, requires that meaningful fiscal buffers exist
at the level of all euro area countries, which in turn
require creating incentives against overborrowing
through standard fiscal channels—one of the purposes of orderly sovereign restructuring. At the
same time, because significant decisionmaking authority in the Banking Union will be centralized,
the possibility of sovereign restructuring does not
obviate the need for a common fiscal backstop. If
decisionmaking authority over national financial
systems is explicitly or implicitly shared, so, too,
must fiscal responsibility.27

Second, while sovereign bankruptcy should obviously not be the first line of defense against banking crises, it can help, even with private borrowing
problems. Ex post, it would provide a framework for
the restructuring of public liabilities regardless of
their origin. To the extent that debt markets believe
that private liabilities could at some point become
public, this should create additional incentives—via
the national treasury—to prevent overborrowing.
In a country with rapidly rising private debt and a
strong chance that this debt will become public, but
without any chance of sovereign debt restructuring,
sovereign borrowing will remain cheap. In the same
world with a chance of debt restructuring, unsustainable private borrowing should at some point begin to affect sovereign risk premia, even if sovereign
debt remains low. Because it gives the fiscal authorities a wake-up call, this is a good thing.
Third, euro area-based Banking Union, a fiscal
backstop and a sovereign debt restructuring regime should be viewed as—indeed, a sovereign
debt restructuring regime is likely necessary for
the proper function of the Banking Union. Based
on the arguments that were made at the beginning
of this chapter, one can in principle imagine two
alternative, internally consistent institutional arrangements for the euro area that recognize the
links between public and private debt. First, one
in which both supervision and resolution remain
national responsibilities, and in which a sovereign
debt restructuring regime deals with national debt
26

The Greek Debt Restructuring—a
Template?
Notwithstanding its restructuring-unfriendly conditions, the euro area recently pulled off the largest debt restructuring in history: the 2012 Greek
bond exchange, which was successful in the sense

 hile it is beyond the scope of this report to propose how these mutual responsibilities should be calibrated, the general principle is clear:
W
There must be a relation between national responsibility for preventing financial sector accidents and the contribution toward the resolution
of a financial sector crisis that would be covered from national fiscal sources before use of ESM resources. The latter could be set as a share
of national GDP (e.g., 20 percent, set uniformly across euro zone members on the assumption that national financial sector responsibilities
comprise similar functions in all countries). Should this exceed national fiscal capacity, sovereign and banking system assets would have to be
restructured jointly.
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of being orderly; in achieving high creditor participation (97 percent); and in resulting in large debt
relief, on the order of 50 percent of GDP.27 Was the
Greek restructuring a game-changer that it could
by itself usher in an era when unsustainable debt
cases in Europe are dealt with through orderly restructuring? Even ignoring the fact that European
policymakers have consistently emphasized that
the Greek case would remain unique and not set
any precedent for the handling of other high-debt
cases, there are reasons to doubt this.

cause the pool of available resources is shrinking,
as demand continues to increase and the potential
roles of the European Financial Stability Facility /
ESM are being expanded (most recently to direct
recapitalization of banks).
Third, the Greek restructuring gave potential
holdouts an easy pass—both by avoiding virtually any threats directed at holdouts ex ante and by
repaying them in full ex post. This creates a precedent that will likely embolden holdouts in future
restructurings.

First, the Greek debt restructuring was quick and
achieved high creditor participation for mainly one
reason: 93 percent of Greek bonds were governed
by local (Greek) law. This permitted the Greek Parliament to “retrofit” a collective action mechanism
on the local law debt stock that operated to sweep
potential holdouts into the deal, and also gave
Greece scope to offer creditors extra incentives
that reduced the appeal of holding out, namely,
an upgrade in governing law. However, not every
euro area country enjoys the local law advantage
that Greece did. This applies particularly to some
of the smaller euro area countries and borrowings
by subsovereign entities. Cyprus is a case in point.
During its recent bail-in of investors, it imposed
the bulk of the pain on its bank depositors, while
holders of its foreign-law-governed bonds (a substantial portion of its debt stock) have been paid in
full and on time.

Fourth, a little-noticed aspect of the Greek restructuring is that it attempted to restructure not only its
sovereign bonds but also some of its sovereign guarantees. Sovereign guarantees can quickly become
direct sovereign obligations when a country hits
a crisis (particularly if the guarantees were being
used to prop up already-weak domestic institutions
that become weaker still when the crisis hits). As a
historical matter, sovereign guarantees have tended not to pose a major problem in restructurings
because distressed nations do not usually have too
many of them. The crisis in the euro area, however, has been different. Many of its members have
issued large volumes of sovereign guarantees in
the period since 2008, and are continuing to do so.
This means that when the next euro area restructuring comes along, the guarantees will also need
to be tackled, without a clear playbook on how to
do so (Buchheit and Gulati 2013).

Second, the Greek approach to restructuring required large volumes of official financing, as the
exchange offer included an exceptionally high “cash
sweetener” to incentivize participation.28 This is unlikely to be repeated. Rescue money is becoming
scarce in the euro area, both because of public and
political opposition to further bailouts and be-

Finally, a large fraction of the bonds issued by the
weaker euro area sovereigns have recently been
moving out of the hands of foreign investors and
into the hands of local banks and other domestic
institutions (Brutti and Sauré 2013). That means
that any significant restructuring of the govern-

 is is not to say that it was perfect. It came far too late, created large risks for the European official creditors, left money on the table, and
Th
ultimately was not deep enough to restore Greece to sustainability. Furthermore, it created a bad precedent in its exceedingly generous
treatment of holdouts. For the details, see Zettelmeyer et al. (2012).
28
Quasi-cash payouts (in the form of short-term European Financial Stability Facility bills) made up about two-thirds of the value of the package
of new instruments offered to Greece’s private creditors. This high reliance on cash seems to have been unprecedented in the history of
sovereign debt restructuring. See Zettelmeyer et al. (2012) for details.
27
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ment’s debt may cause a domestic banking crisis.
Of course, this is the reason why the migration of
sovereign debt to domestic holders, and banks in
particular, could be happening. Domestic banks
are relatively immune from restructurings because
they expect to be recapitalized, for financial stability reasons, if their losses from domestic sovereign
bond holdings are sufficiently high. Indeed, if the
holdings of the banking system as a whole are high
enough, the restructuring will likely not happen at
all (see Broner et al. 2010).

It is telling that distressed debt investors explicitly targeted Greek bonds with
U.K.-law CACs: These holdout investors
succeeded by purchasing blocking minorities in individual bond series, which
could not be offset by pro-restructuring
majorities elsewhere. Though euro area
CACs contain an “aggregation feature”
that allows changes at the individual bond
level to be decided with a lower majority
if enough investors across all bonds vote
for a restructuring, this feature is much
weaker than the mechanism for aggregating bondholder votes across all domestic
law bonds that was used in Greece.29 Furthermore, euro-CACs do not deal with the
vast existing stock of European sovereign
debt. Some of this was issued under domestic law so that CACs can be “retrofitted” if necessary, but a significant amount
of it is not.

Hence, while the Greek debt restructuring approach
was successful in Greece and can be useful in specific cases, it falls short of providing a template that
could be a permanent fixture of the European financial architecture. Indeed, its success was partly due to strategies—including the large-scale use
of cash incentives, and the generous treatment of
holdouts—that may make future restructurings
more difficult.
•

Are the New Euro-CACs the
Solution?
Since January 2013, newly issued European sovereign bonds have begun to incorporate collective
action clauses. The trigger for a debt restructuring (both sovereign, as in the case of Greece, and
private, as in Cyprus) is based on an ex-post debt
sustainability assessment by the Troika i.e., the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF). The
intention of these clauses is to facilitate debt restructuring when appropriate and improve incentives ex ante. But unfortunately, the new regime is
unlikely to be sufficient, for two main reasons:
•

Case-by-case sustainability analyses are
part of the negotiation, and not predictable.
As such, they do not help with the ex-ante
distortions, particularly when declaring a
country insolvent remains an unattractive
option in light of the restructuring barriers
that remain even with euro-CACs.

A possible solution might be to reform the newly introduced euro-CACs in a way that they allow
aggregation across bond series, without bond-bybond voting. However, even if this happened, it
will take another 5 to 10 years until they will be
contained in the majority of euro area sovereign
bonds. Until then, there will be a mixed regime of
pre-2013 bonds (mostly without CACs) and post2013 bonds (with euro-CACs). And even in 10
years, it is not clear whether euro-CACs would ever
be used, as the decision to withhold ESM support
and encourage countries to restructure remains

Although euro-CACs may help with the
ex-post debt restructuring, they are no
panacea, as they need to be voted on bond
by bond (see Gelpern and Gulati 2013).

The aggregate voting threshold is higher than in the Greek “retrofit” CAC (75 rather than 66.67 percent). Furthermore, euro-CACs require at
least a 66.67 percent vote in each individual bond issuance, while in Greece it was sufficient to reach this threshold in aggregate.

29 
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discretionary, and may or may not be optimal ex
post. This is far from the regime that Europe needs
to both succeed in future restructurings and create
good incentives ex ante.

Finally, the two-pack introduces EU-level budget
monitoring and coordination through a common
budgetary time line and procedures. For the euro
area countries, the commission will now examine
and give an opinion on the draft budget, and may
ask for the submission of a revised plan.

Is a Debt Restructuring Regime
Redundant?

With all these new instruments and powers, one
could conclude that the euro area is already sufficiently equipped to ensure fiscal discipline and
prevent repeated debt crisis. However, this conclusion would be premature, for two reasons.

After the obvious failure of the fiscal (and macroeconomic) framework, the EU and the euro area
embarked on a large-scale effort to strengthen its
governance. In particular, the so-called six-pack
(i.e., six regulations designed to strengthen fiscal
discipline and macroeconomic surveillance) was
adopted by all EU member states in 2011; an intergovernmental treaty (Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance), also called the “fiscal
compact,” was signed by 25 EU member states in
2012; and two further regulations (the “two-pack”)
entered into force in the countries of the euro area
in 2013.30

First, although the fiscal compact mandates fiscal rectitude and prohibits the ESM from helping
countries that do not comply (after an adjustment
period, agreed on country by country), it does not
provide any alternative instruments for dealing
with a debt crisis. This means that if a country does
not follow the rules and a crisis does arise, European policymakers will again be caught between
a rock and a hard place. If they reject a country’s
call for support, they will likely force it into a debt
restructuring, but without tools that legitimize the
restructuring and ensure its orderliness. This may
again lead to pressures to make an exception and
allow the ESM to lend to the country after all—
very similar to the pressures that led the IMF, for
example, to change its exceptional access criteria
in order to enable it to lend to Greece.

Together, these new regulations have substantially
changed the governance of the euro area. On the
fiscal side, for instance, excessive deficit procedures
may now be launched on the basis of a debt ratio
above 60 percent of GDP that does not diminish
sufficiently rapidly. The debt reduction path must
follow a numerical benchmark, and progressive
financial sanctions kick in at earlier stages than
previously. The fiscal compact further reinforces
fiscal targets, mandates their implementation in
national law—preferably at the constitutional level—and gives the European Court of Justice the
right to monitor the implementation of the law
and impose sanction for noncompliance. Furthermore, the ESM is barred from lending to countries
that violate the fiscal compact, giving countries a
further incentive to keep their fiscal house in order;
by the same token, the presence of the ESM should
not cause incentives to engage in fiscal profligacy.

30

Second, the most of the new rules aim at improving discipline in fiscal terms. Although the
six-pack also introduces a new macroeconomic imbalance procedure, which together with the
European Systemic Risk Board is to monitor and
prevent excessive risk taking in the financial and in
the private sector. However, this may not be sufficient to rule out situations where a country’s debt
becomes unsustainable because of the accumulation or “discovery” of quasi-fiscal liabilities which
become fiscal in a crisis.

S ee European Commission, “Six-Pack? Two-Pack? Fiscal Compact? A Short Guide to the New EU Fiscal Governance,” http://ec.europa.
eu/economy_finance/articles/governance/2012-03-14_six_pack_en.htm. The ESM treaty and the fiscal compact (“Treaty on Stability,
Coordination, and Governance”) are also available on the European Commission’s Web site.
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Building a debt restructuring framework for Europe on top of its existing fiscal governance would
at worst be costless and at best essential. If the new
rules do indeed ensure that the debt of all euro area
members declines to below 60 percent of GDP and
remains there, the restructuring regime would
serve as a second line of defense that may never
be breached. The probability of a debt restructuring in such a case would be minimal, and so would

be any impact of a debt restructuring regime on
borrowing costs. If, conversely, the new rules do
not work as intended—as may be the case if euro
area countries are not able or willing to live up to
their new commitments, or if their debts become
unsustainable for reasons outside the new fiscal
rules—a debt restructuring regime would harness
market discipline in normal times and provide a
safety valve in crisis times.
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CHAPTER 5:

P olicy Proposals for the Euro Area
and Beyond
coherent statutory mechanism along the lines of
the IMF’s 2003 SDRM proposal would not work,
simply because the debtor countries would not invoke it because of fear of stigma and economic collapse; and the other euro area countries, the ECB
and other EU authorities would oppose its use for
fear of contagion and legal challenge.

What Should A Reform Achieve?
Ideally, to meet the objectives outlined in the previous sections, a debt restructuring regime would
meet four conditions:
•

Address the ex-ante problem of mispricing of risk and overborrowing through a
predictable regime that sets transparent
criteria for sovereign restructuring and
limits the scope of official sector involvement;

•

Make sovereign debt restructuring in
unsustainable debt cases politically and
legally legitimate—removing the stigma
that contributed to the misdiagnosis of the
Greek case, for example;

•

Provide a crisis management framework
that reduces the economic cost and systemic financial risks of debt restructuring
to manageable levels, both in the country
that restructures and in countries with exposures to the restructuring country; and

•

Deal with the holdout problem ex post.

Given the plethora of sovereign debt problems
presented in chapters 2, 3 and 4, the first and best
approach to addressing these problems would presumably be fully fledged international sovereign
insolvency–cum–crisis management regime that
is capable of dealing with many inefficiencies at
once. But such a regime is practically and politically unfeasible. In light of this, we structure the
remainder of the discussion as follows:

The first three conditions are as critical (or more
so) as the fourth one. Unless they are met, debtor countries will continue to be subject to creditor
runs. In the case of the euro area, even a legally

•

At the global level, the main difficulty is to
obtain a critical level of political support
for institutional or legal reform that would
have consequences in most if not all major
international jurisdictions. In light of this,
we review several reform options that are
increasingly more ambitious and deliver
better solutions at the price of requiring
a greater degree of consensus across governments.

•

In the euro area, creating or modifying
common institutions is far less taboo.
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Indeed, a treaty-based sovereign insolvency regime in Europe would pale in comparison with some of the dramatic institutional changes in the euro area that have
already been made or are in the process
of being negotiated—starting, of course,
with the common currency itself, and
more recently comprising the creation
of the ESM, the fiscal compact, and the
Banking Union. The challenge lies in the
details of how to design such a regime, and
particularly in how to manage the transition from the present crisis, when expectations of debt restructuring could easily
turn out to be self-fulfilling, including in
countries where it may be better to reduce
debt levels through a combination of adjustment and economic recovery rather
than through restructuring.

Getting Serious about Aggregation
As briefly described in the previous chapter, euro
area nations have introduced an aggregation feature in all new sovereign bond contracts that would
make it more difficult for holdouts to obtain blocking majorities in individual bonds. Specifically, the
supermajority threshold that needs to be obtained
in order to restructure individual bonds is lower if
there is a large supermajority across all bonds that
favors the restructuring.
In the post-Argentina/NML world, these aggregation features may not go nearly far enough, particularly in a global context. Individual bond series
of smaller countries can be so small (and cheap,
in a distressed debt case) to be easily purchased by
prospective holdouts in their entirety. To deal with
these holdouts, modest trade-offs between supermajorities at the aggregate and the individual bond
levels are unlikely to be sufficient. Instead, what
might be needed is an aggregation mechanism
along the lines used in the Greek restructuring of
2012, which allowed for the restructuring of individual bonds issued under Greek law even against
the wishes of the majority of holders of that bond,
provided that the restructuring was backed by a
supermajority of bondholders across all bonds.31
In the case of Greece, what mattered was only the
aggregate support for the proposed restructuring; that is, the wishes of the holders of individual
Greek law bond series were not even considered.
In the context of the Greek restructuring offer,
which went out of its way to avoid discriminating
against bondholders that chose to vote against the
proposed restructuring,32 this was both effective
and arguably fair.

International Solutions
At the international level, we distinguish three reform options.

31
32

•

The first two are aimed exclusively at the
holdout problem. We distinguish between
a purely contractual approach (Option 1),
and limited statutory reform (Option 2).
Neither is likely to have a major impact on
incentives to overborrow or on the “too
little too late” problem with regard to debt
restructuring.

•

The third alternative is somewhat more
ambitious, and would involve the IMF.
It would both address the holdout problem and could have a limited impact on
incentives more broadly—particularly the
problem that countries tend to restructure
too little.

In a more general setting, one needs to be careful
to avoid a contractual change that could enable the
expropriation of a minority of creditors—that is,

Namely, 66.67 percent of face value, provided bondholders representing a least 50 percent of face value participated in the vote.
For the details, see Zettelmeyer, Trebesch, and Gulati (2013).
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a situation where a supermajority of creditors attempts to extract a disproportionate haircut from a
minority (e.g., the creditors in a small bond issue).
To avoid this, two avenues are conceivable:
•

•

because this would require debt exchanges of existing bond series against otherwise identical bonds
with aggregation provisions.

A Limited Statutory Reform

The conventional approach is to seek consent at both the aggregate level and, for
each individual bond series, albeit with
lower majority thresholds, at the individual series level. As argued above, the problem with this approach is that it allows
holdouts to concentrate their holdings in
some of the smaller bond issues, where
they can block at least a portion of the restructuring.

As described in chapter 3, holdouts in Argentina’s
debt restructuring have found a way of inflicting
major collateral damage by threatening the conduits of payments to creditors under performing
debt contracts. Thus the attack targets trustees,
payments and clearing systems around the world.
The countermeasure would be to adopt legislation
immunizing all payment and clearing systems in
large financial centers, much as Belgium immunized Euroclear from creditor injunctions in response to Elliott’s lawsuit against Peru:

A better approach would be to require
a separate “per series” vote only in cases
where the terms of the proposed restructuring are not uniformly applicable across
all the series of bonds. This “uniformly applicable” requirement should prevent an
issuer from colluding with the holders of
certain series to discriminate against others.33

Any cash settlement account maintained with
the operator of a system or with a cash settlement
agent, as well as any cash transfer, through a Belgian or foreign credit institution to be credited to
such cash settlement account, cannot be attached,
put under sequestration or otherwise blocked by
any means by a participant (other than the operator or the settlement agent), a counterpart or a
third party. (Euroclear translation of Belgian Act
of April 28, 1999, as amended by Act of November 19, 2004)

Getting serious about aggregation in the manner described in the second approach would be
a significant departure from existing practice in
the drafting of bond contracts. Experience tells
us that coordinating marketwide changes in contracting practices can both be difficult and slow,
even where there is widespread agreement regarding the welfare benefits of such a move. For this
reason, strong aggregation features are unlikely
to come about spontaneously. If the shift to aggregation must occur quickly, there will probably
need to be a significant dose of official sector encouragement, as there was with the CAC initiative
in the New York law market in 2002–03.34 Even
greater coordination would be needed to include
aggregation features in the existing stock of bonds,

It would be sufficient to coordinate and adopt substantively the same legislation for a handful of financial centers in which most sovereign bonds are
issued and traded. Immunizing market infrastructure from holdouts would increase the attractiveness of financial centers adopting this measure, because it would reduce the likelihood of disruption
from lawsuits against participants or beneficiaries.
This limited reform might provide a global solution to the problem of holdouts emboldened by the
prospects of third-party enforcement. But it would
only serve to reestablish the balance of power that

33 

“Uniformly applicable” does not necessarily mean that all bonds series would have to be transformed into an identical instrument or bundle of
instruments. E.g., a uniform extension of the maturity of all series by five years, or a reduction of all coupons by 1 percentage point, or by 20
percent, would also constitute a “uniform applicable” change.
34
For the details, see Gelpern and Gulati (2006); and Bradley and Gulati (2012).
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existed before NML v. Argentina. It would not address incentives to overborrow, to procrastinate
and to restructure too little, too late.

In principle, the IMF’s internal rules forbid the
Fund from lending to such countries even now. In
practice, however, these rules were overruled or
reinterpreted to enable the Fund to lend in cases
such as Greece. Part of the reason for the pressure
to do so is that international crisis lending, combined with domestic adjustment and reform, is
currently “the only game in town” when the official
community attempts to help countries in a debt
crisis. The IMF can offer this traditional package,
or offer nothing.

This solution could be implemented through
changes in the relevant law as of major financial
centers. Presumably, such legislation would present a competitive advantage of the first moving financial center because it would attract trading and
payment business to that location. However, for
the same reason some coordination and harmonization of immunization policies may be desirable.

To address this problem, and to effectively give the
IMF a second instrument for assisting high-debt
countries, a dedicated IMF lending facility could
be created, which we refer to as the Sovereign Debt
Adjustment Facility (SDAF).35 It would serve two
main—related—purposes: to create a stronger
commitment device for the Fund not to be drawn
into bailing out countries whose debts are likely
unsustainable unless these countries also restructure; and to protect countries that undertake orderly restructurings in the context of the SDAF
from holdouts.

An IMF-Based Sovereign Debt
Adjustment Program
The two proposals so far have the advantage that
they do not create new international institutions
(or change the rules of existing ones) or require
new treaties or treaty changes. But by requiring
less, they also achieve less. Because they focus only
on the holdout problem, they would not address
the incentives to overborrow and procrastinate
that relate to the moral hazard caused by international bailouts, political economy and the other distortions discussed in chapter 2. Hence, they
would not have much of an impact on strengthening incentives ex ante.

Criteria. To qualify for IMF access under an SDAF,
the country would need to be in a situation where
debt sustainability is no longer assured without
substantial debt relief. The Fund would have to
establish criteria under which countries would
be eligible for an SDAF in a similar fashion as the
criteria that were established for qualification under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
initiative. Like in the HIPC initiative, it will be
necessary to have a multidimensional scheme (using a combination of debt-level and vulnerability
indicators)—which would, however, be defined
ex ante. Countries that fall under the criteria determined by this scheme would not have access to
IMF crisis lending except under the SDAF.

To make progress in this area—and to deal with
the holdout problem at the same time—it is necessary to both make it more difficult for governments to postpone necessary debt restructurings
by resorting to international official borrowing,
and to make the restructuring process less risky
and more predictable. At the international level,
the only practical way of achieving that is through
a modification of the way in which the IMF assists
countries with debt burdens that run a significant
risk of being unsustainable.

35

This section is draws on proposals by Broomfield and Buchheit (2013) and Panizza (2013).
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This would imply a shift from the status quo,
where debt sustainability assessments are case by
case and tend to be relevant only after the fact, that
is, when the country has almost lost market access.
The advantage of such an approach is that it would
bind the IMF ex ante and would remove the process of establishing debt sustainability from the negotiation process, and would also avoid the somersaults that happened in the case of the Greece.
The disadvantage, of course, is that it would not be
easy to establish criteria for lending in debt adjustment and restructuring cases that applied across
countries.

requests other forms of IMF support. If the Fund
accepts the country’s request, it would prepare a
draft Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA), which
sets out the macroeconomic adjustments as well as
the contributions expected from the debtors multilateral, bilateral and private creditors (in the twostep variant discussed above, this would become
relevant in the second step). In preparing a DSA,
the Fund would be guided by the principle of equitable burden sharing among all classes of creditors
except for recognized exceptions such as multilateral financial institutions and, where appropriate,
trade/supplier creditors, short-term treasury bill
holders and similar categories.

A variant that addresses the problem of defining
ex-ante criteria that will “fit” all countries might
work as follows. SDAF criteria would still be established, but instead of tying any IMF lending
to a debt restructuring, they would trigger a twostep procedure.36 In the first step, a country would
have the option of requesting a traditional adjustment program, on the condition of defining country-specific criteria that would, if they are triggered, prevent the Fund from extending further
assistance without debt relief—which would be the
second step. This proposal would address the presence of a “gray area” in which predefined criteria
raise doubts about the lack of debt sustainability,
but the country argues (and IMF staff might agree)
that these criteria are too coarse and insufficiently
country specific, and that adjustment could potentially rectify the situation without a debt restructuring. The essential difference between this variant of the SDAF and the status quo is that, under
its current rules, once programs go off track the
Fund has broad leeway to adjust conditionality
and continue lending. Under an SDAF, this leeway
would be restricted to support programs that embed a debt restructuring.

The draft DSA would be discussed with the debtor
countries’ authorities and comments could also be
invited from creditors, citizens of the debtor country and civil society groups. If an agreement were
to be reached between the debtor country and the
IMF, the process would proceed in a manner consistent with the final DSA.
Restructuring. The debtor country would approach
each creditor group, creditor committee or similar
body and seek debt relief consistent in a net present
value sense with the assumptions of the final DSA.
The draft DSA would be posted on a publicly available Web site, and interested parties (creditors, citizens of the debtor country and civil society groups)
would be invited to comment. If thought appropriate, the staff of the IMF could invite interested parties to present their views in person.
Following discussions with each affected creditor class, the debtor country would formulate the
terms of its restructuring proposal with each creditor group holding claims that would be eligible to
participate in the restructuring (eligible claims).
The IMF would review each of these proposals
to ensure that it would be, in a net present value
sense, not more burdensome to the creditor that
shall be required by the assumptions of the DSA.

The trigger of the process would continue to be in
the hands of the debtor country. The country would
request an SDAF in the way in which it currently

36

See Panizza (2012).
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from time to time and (ii) in which the holders of
at least 75% (measured by principal amount) of the
Eligible Claim Contracts of that class have elected to
participate. (“Eligible Claim Contracts” means contracts relating to debt instruments that are eligible
to participate in a Sovereign Debt Adjustment Program approved by the Fund.)

The restructuring could be subject to supermajority creditor control by requiring the support of
holders of at least 75 percent of the affected debt
instruments.
“Defanging” Holdouts. Holdouts could be dealt
with by immunizing, in all IMF member countries, the assets and revenue streams of the debtor country against attachment by the holder of a
debt instrument that was invited to participate in
a Fund-approved SDAF but declined to do so. This
would be similar to the limited reform discussed in
the last section in the sense that it would immunize
the payment streams rather than limiting creditor
rights directly. It would essentially simply add a
new category to the immunities that most countries already recognize for foreign state property.

The SDAF has some commonalities with the IMF’s
2003 SDRM proposal, which also attempted to
find a way of dealing with holdouts with the consent of a supermajority of creditors. There are two
main differences:
•

From a legal perspective, the SDAF would
be much less intrusive than the SDRM
proposed by the IMF in 2002–3. Unlike
the SDRM, there would not be no automatic stay of litigation; no tribunal to hear
disputes between the debtor and its creditors; and no mechanism for binding all
creditors to the will of the supermajority.
Holdouts would retain their claims, but
could not expect to satisfy them by attempting (through judicial mechanisms)
to seize the property of the debtor state
held in the territory of a member.

•

From an economic perspective, the main
emphasis of the SDAF, unlike the SDRM,
would be to establish a commitment device that would preclude the Fund from
financing countries with doubtful debt
sustainability. In its two-step variant, the
SDAF would essentially constitute a structured learning process, which, in the first
step, would give the benefit of the doubt
to traditional adjustment, but where debt
restructuring would become a binding requirement after an initial adjustment attempt failed.

The reform could be implemented through a
change in the Articles of Agreement of the IMF:
Article VIII 2 (a) of the IMFs Articles of Agreement
could be amended by adding the following text:
“Any such restrictions imposed by a member in accordance with a Sovereign Debt Adjustment Program
(as defined below) approved by the Fund shall for
the purposes of this Article VIII 2(a), be deemed approved by the Fund. The assets and revenue streams
of a member that has implemented a Sovereign Debt
Adjustment Program approved by the Fund shall not
be subject to any form of attachment garnishment,
execution, injunctive relief or similar form of judicial
process in the territories of any member in connection with an Eligible Claim Contract (defined below)
for which the holder elects not to participate in that
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Program.
“Sovereign Debt Adjustment Program,” with reference to a class of creditors, means a debt adjustment
program of a member that (i) is designed and implemented in a manner consistent with the Executive
Board’s decision taken at its meeting on ____ __,
2014 (“Fund Policy with Respect to Members’ Debt
Restructuring Initiatives”), as that Policy may be
amended or supplemented by the Executive Board

A European Solution
As discussed in the previous section, a sovereign debt resolution regime that deals with both
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ex-ante and ex-post distortions is both more important and more realistic for the euro area than
a comprehensive solution may be at the global
level. Moreover, it could serve as a benchmark
for any future global approaches. One advantage
of the euro area is that there already exists a fiscal
framework with debt thresholds that define fiscal
solidity, to which all member countries have made
a commitment. A European Sovereign Debt Restructuring Regime (ESDRR) needs to tie into this
framework. Furthermore, for reasons of legitimacy and to be able to manage the collateral damage
of debt restructuring, an ESDRR would need to be
incorporated into the broader European crisis response framework.

The proposed regime deals with two problems:
1.	 The ex-ante problem—by conditioning
official lending on a restructuring regime
and by designing the “when, how and how
much” debt restructuring that is to be expected; and
2.	 The ex-post problem of immunizing the
restructuring against holdouts.
The Vehicle.37 The ESDRR would be based on the
European Stability Mechanism and take the form
of a change in the ESM treaty to the effect of (1)
conditioning ESM lending to certain debt thresholds and (2) preventing holdouts in ESM-sanctioned debt restructurings from enforcing their
claims through European courts. At the same time,
both the restructuring country and “innocent bystanders” would need to have access to ESM lending to deal with the fallout of a restructuring.

A European Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Regime for the Long
Run
It is important to stress that our proposal for an
ESDRR is not meant as to remedy the ongoing sovereign crisis. The ESDRR is a regime for the long
run; its main purpose is to set incentives against
excessive public (and indirectly also private) debt
accumulation. To address the problems of the
present debt overhang, creative and more flexible
solutions will be needed (although such solutions
could borrow our proposal’s approach to the expost problem—that is, shielding sovereigns from
holdouts if additional debt restructurings were to
become necessary). The special difficulty in marrying the short and the long run is that incentives
for adjustment now and prevention thereafter need
to be aligned. Here, we present a European Debt
Redemption Pact as a proposal that addresses the
short-run problems and could serve as a bridge to
the long-run ESDRR described here.

Conditioning ESM Lending on Debt
Thresholds
As noted above, the euro area already has a fiscal
framework embodying a definition of fiscal solidity, which revolves around the debt level of 60 percent. Our regime ties into this framework by using
the 60 percent level as the threshold for conditioning official crisis lending by the ESM.38 At debt levels below 60 percent, ESM lending would be largely unconditional. At 60 percent plus x (i.e., the upper threshold), ESM lending would be conditional
on debt restructuring. In the intermediate space
(between 60 percent and the upper threshold), the
status quo regime of “constructive ambiguity” or
“restructure only if absolutely needed” would remain. The effect would be to limit the range within

 is section is based on Buchheit, Gulati, and Tirado (2012); Weder di Mauro and Zettelmeyer (2010); and German Council of Economic
Th
Experts (2012).
38
A related proposal that uses the 60 percent threshold (without a buffer zone) is the blue/red bold proposal by von Weiszäcker and Delpla
(2010): Financing above 60 percent debt (with red bond) would be at risk of restructuring, whereas below 60 percent a joint and mutual
guarantee would make restructuring highly unlikely.
37
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which the official sector is incentivized in order to
gamble for resurrection and create moral hazard
on the side of private creditors, but at the same
time provide enough flexibility to accommodate
large economic shocks.

reduce debt costs through reliance on relatively cheap short-term financing—particularly when debt limits approach the
upper threshold. This would be akin to
gambling for redemption, encouraged by
the fact that if excessively short-term debt
were to trigger a liquidity crisis, the EMS
would be there to help without necessarily
requiring a debt restructuring—so long as
total debt was below the threshold.

Of course, there are several potential problems in
using a particular debt threshold to define the restructuring regime:
•

•

•

A debt threshold is an imperfect measure
of solvency. It could lead to errors on both
sides: Debts might be unsustainable even
though the threshold is not reached, and
some countries’ debts might be sustainable even though they exceed the threshold. From the point of view of minimizing
such errors, it would be better to opt either for country-specific debt limits or for
much more complex rules that take into
account off-balance-sheet items, considerations regarding the denominator (GDP
vs. gross national product—the latter is 20
percent lower in Ireland than the former),
the net international investment position,
growth prospects due to demography and
structural factors and, last but not least,
political ability and a willingness to tax.

Although these are important concerns, we believe
that they are either mitigated by the European
situation or can be addressed with the proposed
framework, as follows.
First, country-specific debt limits or complex solvency formulas are not desirable, for a number of
reasons. The more complex the formula, the harder it would be to agree ex ante, and the greater the
scope for manipulation ex post, undermining its
credibility. Country-specific debt limits, conversely—for example, higher limits for countries that
are deemed to have better institutions or more
flexible economies, or possibly have historically
shouldered larger debts—would not be accepted in
Europe on equal treatment grounds and would be
inconsistent with the logic of euro area membership, which carries the assumption of and commitment to convergence. Therefore, the economic parameters and fiscal threshold should be the same
for all countries in the long-run equilibrium.

A further consideration is that simple
rules may not help credibility, if they turn
out to be so inefficient ex post that the
political system will find a way around
them. The debt and deficit limits embedded in the Maastricht Treaty are a case in
point. Furthermore, as in all cases when
numbers become targets, conditioning on
debt thresholds may create incentives to
manipulate these statistics (“Goodhart’s
Law”).

This leaves the euro area with a simple choice:
to adopt simple ex-ante rules that constrain discretion when structuring ESM-led rescues, or to
adopt no rules. Given the biases that currently
exist against any form of debt restructuring (see
chapter 4), pure discretion would lead to bigger
errors than simple rules. This, in a nutshell, is the
main argument for the proposed approach.

Finally, tying officially sanctioned debt
restructuring to just one solvency measure—a debt threshold—might distort
country policies in ways that create vulnerabilities through other channels. In
particular, it might create incentives to

Second, analogies between the lack of credibility
of debt limits in the original Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP) and the debt limits as proposed here
ignore the fundamentally different nature of these
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limits. In the context of the SGP, the limits were
supposed to bind sovereign nations—a tall order,
particularly with regard to powerful countries such
as Germany and France, which in 2003 colluded to
prevent the enforcement of the rules. Writing the
charter of an official lender in a way that denies
a country that has broken a debt ceiling finance
is not the same—and is much more credible—as
prohibiting that country from breaking the ceiling.
Furthermore, the chance that euro area countries
would collude to change the ESM rules is much
lower. In particular, unlike the violation of the SGP
limits, there is no sense that countries like Germany and France might benefit tomorrow by accepting a breach of the rule by another country today.

itself solve the private sector’s debt problems, it
may well ameliorate them; markets will be more
likely to “price” sovereign default risks regardless
of whether these originate from sovereign debt or
from socialized private debt. This should give incentives to sovereigns to worry more about credit
booms that could give rise to quasi-fiscal liabilities.
This leaves one potentially serious source of unintended consequences: the possibility that focusing all attention on just one number could invite
misbehavior along other dimensions that carry no
weight under the rules. However, there are ways to
address this problem. In particular, greater use of
short-term debt could be penalized by imposing
the rule that in the event of a debt restructuring,
haircuts on short-term debt will be higher than on
longer maturities. At debt levels below 60 percent
(where ESM lending is not conditional on fiscal
adjustment and restructurings are excluded), the
existing SGP criteria may need to be supplemented by a limit on the ratio of short- to long-term
debt.

What about fears that debt/GDP numbers could be
manipulated?39 While this can never be ruled out,
it is arguably less of an issue in the EU today than
before, or internationally. Debt/GDP numbers are
already enshrined in the fiscal framework and are
closely monitored by the European Commission.
One of the lessons of the euro debt crisis was to
award Eurostat more powers to monitor countries’
debt statistics and to close loopholes as they emerge
(e.g., by defining the treatment of financial derivatives or of the liabilities of government-sponsored
bad banks). Therefore, the risks of implicit debt are
within the scope of the monitoring process in the
EU at various levels. In addition to Eurostat, the
European Systemic Risk Board and the Single Supervisory Mechanisms have a mandate to monitor
contingent liabilities in the private and financial
sectors. Also, as noted above, while a European
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Regime will not by

39

The long-run regime-governing debt restructurings
in the euro area would be defined through the lending policies of the ESM, in the following manner:
1. Below 60 percent debt, access to the ESM is
almost unconditional, in the sense that the
ESM would not require fiscal adjustment
or debt restructuring, except for a limit on
short-term debt. Other types of conditionality may still apply, particularly in banking
crises.

In defining public debt one crucial distinction is between gross and net debt (see, e.g., Panizza and Presbitero 2013): Net government debt is
normally obtained by subtracting the financial assets held by the government from gross debt. Differences between gross and net debt can be
very large. At the end of 2012, average gross debt in countries that belong to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development was
close to 110 percent of the group’s GDP, but net debt was almost 40 percentage points lower than gross debt. Large differences between net and
gross debt are sometimes due to the fact that the government holds a large fraction of its own debt. For instance, part of the U.S. government
debt is held in the U.S. Social Security Trust Fund. Therefore, U.S. statistical sources often mention a measure of debt (“debt held by the public”)
that nets out these cross-holdings, and it is thus similar to a concept of net debt. In other cases, large difference between gross and net debt arise
from the accumulation of international reserves or the presence of sovereign wealth funds. Calculating net debt requires a precise evaluation of
government’s assets and liabilities. This is a difficult exercise. Even netting cross-holdings of public sector bonds by separate public entities, and
between national and subnational governments is not a simple exercise. Netting out cross-holdings of government assets also requires adjusting
debt ratios for the liabilities associated with these cross-holdings. As a consequence, each country has its own definition of net debt which
makes the statistic useless for cross country comparison. The EU defines government debt as used in the Maastricht criteria as gross debt and
mandates Eurostat is to ensure a homogenous application of the definition across countries.
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2. Between 60 percent and an upper threshold, access to the ESM is conditional on
and fiscal adjustment and structural conditionality. Debt restructuring would not be
expected unless a debt sustainability analysis suggested that it is needed. In case of restructuring, debt of short maturities would
be subject to a heavier haircut.

the long run. Bail-ins would remain unlikely and
unpredictable.
Of particular importance, the upper threshold
would not necessarily act as an automatic restructuring trigger, nor as universal debt ceiling.
It might be possible for a country to carry debt
above the threshold if it could retain market confidence. But even if markets are willing to provide
the finance, this does not necessarily mean that it
is optimal to carry very high debt.

3. Above the upper threshold, access to
ESM support is only be possible with an
ESM-sanctioned debt restructuring program. The minimal extent of restructuring
should be such that the countries debt level
falls below the upper threshold with a safety
margin.

There are cases of countries with very high debt
levels (above 100 or even 200 percent of GDP)
that do not seem to be in danger of losing market access. But these are likely special cases where
national savers and financial intermediaries are
prepared to sustain these debt levels.40 In the euro
area, the zone of vulnerability now seems to be
much lower, or else Italy would not be considered
a problem. Furthermore, given the demographics and relatively low potential growth prospects
of advanced countries, it seems hard to argue that
very high debt levels are optimal from a growth
perspective (let alone from the intergenerational
distribution perspective).

Setting the Upper Threshold. In deciding where to
set the higher threshold, there needs to be a balance
between allowing flexibility and limiting overborrowing (see box 3). Countries that appear fiscally
sound may experience sudden and large surges in
debt levels during crises. Sudden debt jumps are
most often the consequence of the eruption of a
banking crisis, a natural disaster, or a war. Contingent debt from the financial system was the cause
of the spectacular increase in debt levels (e.g., in
Iceland or Ireland). In the future architecture of the
euro area, such increases in debt due to banking liabilities should be mitigated by a common regime
for bank restructuring and resolution.

Fixing the upper debt ceiling will require further
research, but a number that is about 1.5 times the
lower ceiling seems reasonable.
Rules for Restructuring. Two rules would govern the amount and form of restructuring: (1) The
minimum amount of restructuring should bring
the debt level below the upper threshold; and (2)
shorter maturity debt would receive a heavier
haircut. Guidelines for the equitable treatment of
various creditor classes would also apply, as described in the context of the SDAF proposed for
the IMF.

The function of the threshold is to bind the hands
of the euro area to share the burden with creditors in high-debt cases. A very low threshold is
not desirable since it might trigger restructurings
even in cases of temporary shocks. But a very high
threshold would imply that the adjustment burden falls only on the shoulders of debtor countries
(and possibly those of official lenders, if their loans
are not repaid). For the financial architecture of
the euro area, a very high threshold would imply
that that the restructuring regime remains irrelevant. The present situation would persist even in
40

The Policy Framework “Ties the Hands” of the
ESM (and the Troika), since they no longer exercise

For an analysis of the Japanese case, see Hoshi and Ito (2013).
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Box 3. Episodes of Surges in Public Debt from 60 Percent
While the lower threshold of 60 percent is generally accepted in the European Union, the upper threshold
will be more contentious. After all, at present most EU members, as well as most other advanced economies, have debt levels of about 90 to 100 percent. Are they all to be considered “restructuring cases”?
First, it is important to stress again that the policies proposed in this section are for the long run (i.e., in
a situation when the legacy of this crisis has been dealt with; see below). Second, we can ask how many
episodes there have been where debt levels increased from below 60 percent to 90 percent, and how
may years this process has taken in the past. Table 2 uses historical gross debt data from the IMF from
1880 to 2010. We identify a total of 20 events in 15 countries, four of them in the euro area. Most episodes of surges in debt from 60 (or below) to 90 (or above) did play out over several years. On average,
such an increase in debt took almost 6.5 years.
Table 2. Episodes of Surges in Debt/GDP from 60 Percent to 90 Percent
Argentina
Argentina
Australia
Canada
Canada
Chile
Chile
Greece
Greece
Iceland
Indonesia
Ireland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Malaysia
Portugal
Singapore
United States
Uruguay
Average

Start
36.2
57.7
59.7
53.2
58.4
47.6
34.0
48.2
60.0
29.1
26.4
59.8
44.3
58.5
57.2
52.7
57.5
59.7
57.1
34.6
49.6

End
90.6
100.7
98.2
102.3
90.2
108.3
117.5
120.0
100.5
92.8
95.9
93.2
92.2
90.8
95.9
106.3
93.3
94.8
98.6
99.9
99.1

Start
1887
1927
1927
1929
1982
1971
1982
1886
1989
2007
1997
1981
2008
1981
1981
1981
2004
1981
2002
1982

End
1891
1931
1932
1932
1992
1975
1984
1888
1992
2010
1999
1988
2010
1988
1996
1986
2010
2001
2010
1984

Years
5
5
6
4
10
4
3
3
5
4
3
8
3
8
15
5
6
19
8
3
6, 4

Note: Advanced or emerging market economies, 1880–2010.
Source: IMF.

We also conducted a similar exercise in which we identified episodes during which debt levels increased
by 30 percent in one or two years irrespective of the starting level of debt. As expected, such extreme
episodes tend to be associated with severe economic dislocations like those in the 1920s and 1930s, or
with twin or triple crises. Overall, however, such debt jumps occurred at initial debt levels above 60
percent. The average starting level of all episodes was 84 percent, and the median was 70 percent.
Overall, the experience of advanced and emerging market economies of the last 130 years suggests that an
upper threshold of debt/GDP between 90 and 100 percent would be enough to provide an adequate buffer
during which adjustment can take place without markets having to worry about debt restructuring.
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of a debt instrument that was eligible to participate
in a restructuring of the debt of the beneficiary ESM
Member after the effective date of this Treaty.

discretion in times of distress. The advantage of
such a framework is that it provides strong ex-ante incentives to discipline fiscal policies while at the
same time narrowing the space within which restructurings and official interventions are possible.

The immunities provided in the preceding paragraph shall automatically expire when all amounts
due to the ESM from the beneficiary ESM Member
have been repaid in full.

To be effective in the sense of creating a genuine
commitment device, the ESDRR would need to
rule out access to IMF resources as a way of circumventing ESM access and restructurings in high
debt cases. An easy way of achieving this would be
to pool euro area membership at the IMF.

An amendment of the ESM treaty for this purpose
would become effective within the jurisdiction of
each of the euro area countries. The potency of the
measure would obviously be enhanced if other EU
members, particularly the United Kingdom, were
to enact comparable immunities in their domestic
law. A country such as the United Kingdom might
for selfish reasons wish to incorporate such immunities into its own law; failure to do so could drive
financial transactions away from London.

By construction, the ESDRR would be binding for
countries of the euro area (since they are members
of the ESM treaty). It may be possible to find ways
for other EU member countries to join this regime
voluntarily.
It is worth reiterating that this type of restructuring regime could not be implemented immediately. While it would constitute a stabilizing and
disciplining mechanism in the long run, it would
be highly destabilizing if implemented while debt
levels are still very elevated. The section on dealing
with legacy debt addresses the problem of transition to the long-run equilibrium and discusses
various options on this path.

The justification for such an amendment of the
ESM treaty from the perspective of the ESM and
its members is self-evident and compelling. ESM
member states will be lending taxpayer resources
into a recipient country. If a restructuring of private sector claims is deemed essential to restore
that country to a sustainable position, the members funding that bailout should not wish to see
the assets and revenue streams of the recipient
sovereign being seized by creditors that elect not
to participate in the restructuring. Every €1 that
is so seized and applied toward the immediate repayment of such a claim will logically require a
corresponding €1 increase in the amount of ESM
bailout assistance. ESM members have a legitimate
interest in minimizing such transfers.

Dealing with Holdouts in the Euro
Area
To immunize restructuring against holdouts, the
2012 Treaty Establishing the European Stability
Mechanism would be amended as follows:
ARTICLE __: Immunity from judicial process

The foregoing is also consistent with the goal expressed in the preamble of the ESM that its funding
to a distressed euro area member nation will receive priority over payments owed to private creditors. To the extent that ESM funds can be seized
by private creditors that have refused to participate
in the restructuring, those private creditors have
effectively reversed the priority order (after all,
they are getting paid and exiting, while the ESM

The assets and revenue streams of an ESM Member
receiving stability support under this Treaty which
are held in, originate from, or pass through the jurisdiction of an ESM Member shall not be subject
to any form of attachment, garnishment, execution,
injunctive relief, or similar forms of judicial process,
in connection with a claim based on or arising out

R evisiti n g s overeig n ban k ruptcy

40

is left holding the bag).41 The modification that we
propose will help ensure that the ESM funding receives its promised priority.

measures already taken within the euro area, substantially replicate the key features of most corporate insolvency regimes. Supermajority creditor
control of a debt workout would occur by requiring the agreement of 75 percent of bondholders as
a condition for ESM endorsement—defined across
all bonds, in line with the aggregate threshold envisaged in the collective action clauses of all euro
area sovereign bonds issued after January 1, 2013.

Two precedents for this sort of mechanism are described in box 4.
An amendment of the ESM treaty along the lines
suggested above would, together with the other

Box 4. Precedents for Treaty-Based Mechanisms to Immunize Certain Payment Streams
The first precedent is relatively recent and directly on point. In May 2003, following the coalition invasion of Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution
1483 (May 22, 2003).42 Among other things, that resolution encouraged the new government in Iraq
to restructure the roughly $140 billion debt stock that Saddam had accumulated during his tenure. In
the context of “the desirability of prompt completion of the restructuring of Iraq’s debt,” the resolution
immunized all the petroleum assets of Iraq against “any form of attachment, garnishment, or execution,” and clothed the proceeds of Iraqi oil sales (along with the bank account into which the proceeds
of all such oil sales were to be directed) with privileges and immunities identical to those enjoyed by
the United Nations itself.
Resolution 1483 was enacted pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. It was
therefore binding on all members of the organization, and the resolution instructs each member state
to “take any steps that may be necessary under their respective domestic legal systems to assure this
protection” of Iraqi oil and financial assets. These UNSC-mandated immunities were periodically renewed and eventually expired on June 30, 2011.43 In Europe, the immunities for Iraqi assets were implemented through EU Regulation 1210/2003 (July 7, 2003) and amended from time to time thereafter
in response to UNSC resolutions.44
It worked. In late 2004, Iraq negotiated an 80 percent nominal write-off of its debt owed to Paris Club
countries and a long-term restructuring of the balance of the claims. This translated into an 89.75 percent reduction in the net present value of those claims. That same net-present-value haircut was then
offered to the holders of roughly $21 billion of Saddam-era debt owed to private sector creditors, and
virtually all those holders accepted it. The UNSC-mandated immunization of Iraqi assets undoubtedly
helped to dampen any hope that a better recovery could be achieved at the sharp end of a litigation.
The Austrian Ministry of Finance has a question-and-answer discussion regarding the ESM on its Web site. Contained in the Q&A are a couple
of questions and answers that help illustrate the point made in the text. On page 14, the question asked is: “Are only speculators going to be
rescued?.” In responding no, the document explains that “if [the] ability [to repay the ESM funding] is not already shown at the outset, then
initially, financial investors will have to waive receivables in the course of debt adjustment proceedings before any aid funding can flow.” On
page 15, the question is “Has there been an infringement of Article 125 TFEU—the “no bailout” clause?” In responding no, the document
explains that “where repayment is at risk, the restructuring clause for private investors will be triggered, because the ESM has priority over
private creditors.” See BMF Ministry of Finance, Q&A European Stability Mechanism, http://english.bmf.gv.at/Allgemeines/FlashContent/
QAEuropeanStability_963/Q_A_European_Stability_Mechanism_(ESM).pdf.
42
See United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1483, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1483%282003%29.
43
See United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1956, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1956%282010%29.
44
See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:169:0006:0023:En:PDF.
41
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The second precedent is from a half century ago, but is relevant in that it shows how a treaty regime can
facilitate a restructuring by constraining the enforcement rights of certain problematic debt claims.
In the period between 1924 and 1930, a number of German companies issued state-backed bonds in
U.S. markets. Subsequently, before World War II, many of these bonds were reacquired by the issuers
for retirement. These bonds, once reacquired, no longer represented valid obligations. However, because
of the war, many of these reacquired bonds did not get canceled (the trustees or paying agents being
generally located in New York). Instead, the uncanceled bonds were held in bank vaults in Germany. In
1945, at the end of the war, a large portion of these uncanceled bonds fell into the hands of the Soviet
forces and were subsequently returned to circulation. When West Germany later sought to negotiate
payments on its portion of the German defaulted debt from the prewar period, the question was how to
distinguish between the authentic outstanding bonds and the ones that had been looted in 1945.45
To solve the problem, the United States and West Germany entered into a treaty on April 1, 1953, that
decreed that the bonds in question would not be enforceable unless they had been first validated by a
joint U.S.-German validation board.46 Further, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission issued
a ruling that U.S. brokers and dealers were prohibited from trading in bonds that had not been validated.47 For over a half century now, this treaty mechanism has held up remarkably well in protecting
against the claims on unvalidated bonds.
Although there would be no “automatic stay” preventing the initiation of creditor lawsuits against
the sovereign debtor, the amendment to the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism
proposed above would effectively shield the debtor
country’s euro-area-based assets from compulsory
seizure by holdout creditors.

At the present juncture, the base case of transiting
into a more stable long run in the euro area seems
to rely primarily on improving the incentives and
control mechanisms (six-pack, two-pack, European semester, and other torture instruments). The
status quo does not provide for debt restructuring
(beyond Greece) and does not foresee any mutualization of debt. It relies on the Outright Monetary
Transactions (OMT) of the ECB, and beyond that
it is based on the hope that the adjustment process
and the structural reforms that debtor countries are
undergoing will eventually bring rewards in terms
of higher growth. The present strategy of dealing
with the legacy debt is risky since it requires an extremely long and unilateral adjustment process on
the side of the high-debt countries. It could easily derail for a number of reasons—for example, if
growth fails to pick up for a few more years, if the
credibility of the OMT fails or if the political will
to drive reform is exhausted.

Dealing with the debt overhang from
the present crisis in the Euro area
At mentioned above the provisions of the ESDRR—in particular, the binding debt thresholds—
are not designed as a solution for the present debt
crisis. In the short run, this option could not be
activated since it would trigger immediate instability. In fact, it would serve a stabilizing function
only if all participating countries start out with a
debt level well below the upper threshold.

 or a fuller description of the background, see Abrey v. Reusch, 153 F. Supp. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); and Mortimer Off Shore Services Ltd v.
F
Federal Republic of Germany 615 F. 3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009).
46
Certain Matters Arising from the Validation of German Dollar Bonds, U.S.–F.R.G., April 1, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 886, T.I.A.S. No. 2794 (entered into
force September 16, 1953).
47
Rule X-1502-3, Adopted Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
45
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There are, however, alternative options for dealing
with the legacy debt problem. The first option is
a minimal one, while the other requires a grand
bargain between euro area countries.

long-run restructuring regime is a European Debt
Redemption Pact, as proposed by the German
Council of Economic Experts (2011, 2012). This
proposal entails a temporary pooling of sovereign debt above 60 percent (of nonprogram countries) and a gradual redemption over a period of
25 years.49 It would take countries about 5 years to
gradually build up the common fund, which would
at peak amount to about €2.3 trillion (the largest
contributors would be Italy, Germany and France).
With reasonable assumptions about growth, interest rates and primary surpluses, countries would
be able to redeem their respective debts over the
following 20 years. The “own” debt level would be
down to 60 percent after five years; therefore, in
principle, the ESDRR regime could become binding after that. This option avoids restructuring legacy debt, but it also requires significant political
will and a long time commitment from the major
euro area countries. Part of the deal would have
to be a substantial strengthening of fiscal controls
(e.g., by agreeing on a specific tax that would automatically increase in case the country falls short
of the committed reform path). Also, there would
have to be institutional mechanisms to ensure
that mutualizing legacy debt would not reoccur. It
would be a grand deal to secure the transition to
a permanent sovereign debt restructuring regime
that effectively harnesses market discipline.

Restructure as Needed If Above the Upper
Threshold. This option assumes that further restructuring of sovereign legacy debt (in particular,
if there is no further debt mutualization) might be
inevitable in some countries. It therefore attempts
to provide minimal conditions for containing the
cost of such a restructuring. In particular, a minor
amendment of the EMS treaty would provide restructuring countries with immunity from judicial
process (as described above). Indeed, this immunity could arguably be implemented through a decision of the ESM Board of Directors, without any
amendment to the treaty.48
In addition, any ESM-sanctioned debt-restructuring programs as a condition of financial support
could be limited to countries with debt above the
long-run upper threshold. The result would be to
limit the range within which debt restructurings can
be expected. While this option would make debt restructuring easier by making life more difficult for
holdouts, it would do little to make restructuring
more likely. The dominant incentives for debtor
and creditors countries in the euro area would still
be to procrastinate and gamble for resurrection, at
least until an effective and durable firewall for other
countries and for banking systems is in place.

Summary of Proposals
The summary table below gives an overview and
comparison of our different proposals to organize
orderly sovereign bankruptcy. The table is orga-

Debt Redemption Pact. One way of crossing the
bridge between the short-run debt overhang and a

 ccording to the preamble of the ESM treaty, ESM funding is to carry preferred creditor status. At the same time, the treaty lacks a mechanism
A
that implements that preferred creditor status. Article 5(7)(n), however, gives the Board of Directors the power to take “any other necessary
decision not explicitly provided for by this Treaty.”
49
The focus of this section is to discuss transitional arrangements that would the euro zone to get from here the status quo (debt above thresholds
and no restructuring regime) to there the proposed long run regime (debt below thresholds and a credible restructuring regime). There are
other proposals with involving partial mutualization that are were designed as permanent features of the euro zone rather than transitory
arrangements. E.g., these include the blue bond proposal by von Weizsäcker and Delpla (2010), which can be viewed as an alternative
restructuring regime that excludes restructurings below 60 percent debt level (the amount of mutually issued blue bonds); Hellwig and
Philippon (2011) propose mutualizing short-term debt, only in order to solve the problem of bond runs. Finally, the European Safe Bonds
proposal by Brunnermeier et al. (2011) provides a solution to the safe asset problem, without mutualization, As an element of the European
financial architecture, it would be consistent with the proposals made in this report, but it does not fix a debt reduction path. The proposal
was not aimed at and as such does not describing a transition path to a restructuring regime with debt thresholds. Nevertheless, it might be a
complement to a debt redemption pact, i.e., a permanent solution to providing a safe asset.
48
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nized in an ascending manner: moving to the right
means applying stronger medicine, and deploying
more political capital, but also moving considerably closer to solving the various incentive problems that mar sovereign debt markets.

The next proposal does address both ex-ante and
ex-post distortions through a new sovereign debt
adjustment facility, the SDAF of the IMF. Countries would have access to the SDAF (and only access to the SDAF, among IMF facilities) in a situation where debt sustainability is no longer assured
without substantial debt relief. The SDAF would
thus establish a commitment device that would
preclude the Fund from financing countries with
doubtful debt sustainability. A minor amendment
of the IMFs Articles of Agreement could provide
instant and global protection of payments on restructured debt holders that had participated in
an SDAF-sponsored restructuring. Because access
to the SDAF would depend on ex-ante criteria—
as well as, of course, a debtor country’s request—
this proposal would have a significant impact on
ex-ante incentives, making it more likely that unsustainable debt situations would be recognized in
a timely way, and that debt restructurings would
restore sustainability.

At the one end of the spectrum is the status quo,
which we argue should be reformed urgently because it provides poor incentives both ex ante and
ex post. The success of holdouts on Argentina and
Greece gives a boost to the business model of distressed debt funds specialized in litigation. They
play a redistribution game, benefiting at the cost
other private and official creditors, but by the same
token making restructuring more difficult and delayed.
The minimum reform at the international level would therefore aim at preventing holdouts by
adopting stronger collective action clauses that
operate across all new debt contracts, giving a supermajority among all bondholders the right to
restructure against the will of a minority (in the
aggregate, and regardless of the votes of individual bond series), as long as the restructuring leads
to bondholders identical payment terms for all
bondholders. This would constitute a significant
improvement over the status quo. But the strength
of this instrument—even for the narrow purpose
of preventing holdouts—would depend on the degree and speed of adoption of strong aggregation
clauses in international debt contracts.

The most far-reaching proposal in this report is
the creation of a European Sovereign Debt Restructuring Regime. As discussed above, the euro
area has both the largest need and the best chances to implement such as comprehensive solution.
We propose implementing the regime through an
amendment of the ESM treaty that defines conditions under which the ESM is allowed to lend only
if the member country also restructures its debt,
and that gives guidelines as to the minimal amount
of restructuring. The treaty change would also
make the assets and payments of euro area member that have undertaken an ESM-sanctioned restructuring immune from attachment by holdouts.
The restructuring regime would tie into the European fiscal framework by using the 60 percent debt
level as a threshold for conditioning official crisis
lending. At debt levels below 60 percent, ESM
lending would be largely unconditional; but at 60
percent plus x (an upper threshold), ESM lending
would be conditional on debt restructuring. The
effect would be to limit the range within which the
official sector can gamble for resurrection and create moral hazard for debtors and private creditors,

An alternative—and possibly complementary—
approach that would “defang” holdouts immediately would require changes in laws or regulations
in the major financial centers in order to immunize
payments and clearing systems against attempts to
attach payments. This would imply, in particular,
that holdouts would find it harder to interfere with
the debt service payments of debtors to creditors
that have agreed to a sovereign debt restructuring.
It is still a minimal proposal, however, because it
does not address poor incentives in the run-up to
a restructuring.
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while at the same time providing enough flexibility
to accommodate large economic shocks. To be effective in credibly binding the hands of the ESM,
access to IMF lending would have to be ruled out
as a way of circumventing ESM conditionality (e.g.,
by pooling euro area membership at the Fund). By
construction, the ESDRR would be binding for the
countries of the euro area (since they are members
of the ESM treaty); however, other EU member
countries might be able to join voluntarily.

The ESDRR could obviously not be implemented
immediately because it would be highly disruptive
during the current ongoing crisis. But it would be a
crucial stabilizing and disciplining mechanism in
the long-run European architecture. In the short
run, the challenge remains to design mechanisms
that bring down debt levels quickly and smoothly
while at the same time not compromising incentives for the long run.
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status quo

status quo

no trigger (de facto IMF also acts
gatekeeper)

No predictable process or criteria:
IMF (or Troika) act as gatekeeper,
diagnostician and prescription writer:
prepares DSA, restructuring is a
possible outcome but criteria are not
fully predictable

Vehicle

Trigger

Process and Criteria
for restructuring

Not clear ex ante: Debtor country
negotiates with creditor groups,
Amount of
formulates restructuring proposal,
restructuring and loss IMF (or Troika) reviews to ensure
sharing
that the proposal is in line with
the assumptions of the Debt
Sustainability Analysis

No global instruments to deal with
contagion, (except CCLs); national
defenses (hoarding of FX reserves,
capital controls and ring-fencing of
banks)

Limiting contagion
and fallout
of sovereign
restructuring

Weak

Weak

Weak

Ex ante: incentives
for better debt
management

Ex ante: incentives
to prevent
procrastination

Ex post: prevent
holdouts

Incentives

Weak
Medium/strong depending on how
many jurisdictions immunize

Weak/medium (depending on the
adoption of strong aggregation
clauses)

Weak

Weak

Weak

status quo

Depends on diffusion of contract

Geographical reach/
and timing

status quo

If adopted in all mayor financial
centers the reach could be almost
universal, debt transactions would
migrate to the centers offering
immunity, effective immediately

No effective limit: holdouts can use
remedies to attach payments and
revenue streams of debtors

Rights and remedies
of holdouts
Need to be introduced in a
coordinated fashion by large
borrowers in advanced and emerging
markets, but would take many years
to become effective

status quo

status quo

Affects remedies of holdouts:
immunizes assets and revenue
streams of a restructured debt
instrument
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Affects rights of holdouts: reduces
their ability gain advantage by
buying small series

status quo

Law changes in major financial
centers to immunize central
counterparties, payments and
clearing systems

Collective action clauses globally,
plus aggregation clauses in the
euro zone

status quo

Limited statutory

Contractual

Immunization

Strong aggregation clauses:
a supermajority among all
bondholders receives full powers
to restructure as long as all
bondholders are offered equal terms

Strong Aggregation

European Solution

New lending policies of ESM
and amendment of ESM treaty to
immunize against holdouts

Statutory

European Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Regime

Eliminates the rights of holdouts of
a debt instrument that was invited to
participate in a ESM restructuring
program become unenforceable in
the territory of the euro zone

Minimum restructuring to bring debt
below upper threshold, short term
debt is subject to a higher haircut

Below 60% debt threshold nearunconditional access, above
60% EMS may only lend with
conditionality and above a second
threshold ESM may only lend with
debt restructuring

Strong

Medium (SDAP will improve
incentives but discretion remains
with the IMF)

Medium (SDAP will improve
predictability but discretion remains
with the IMF)

status quo

Strong

High powered since price reaction
ex ante will be stronger as debt
thresholds are approached

High powered since debt thresholds
are transparent and predictable, risk
premia will reflect this

Banking Union and single bank
restructuring and resolution regime
to complement and limit fallout from
sovereign restructuring

In principle the euro zone but other
Territories of IMF member countries,
countries could join on a voluntary
effective immediately
basis, effective immediately

Affects remedies of holdouts:
immunizes assets and revenue
streams of a debt instrument that
was invited to participate in a IMF
approved SDAP

In principle like status quo but
minimus restructuring to restore
debt sustainability could be defined
ex ante

SDAF sets out the criteria for
eligibility, IMF prepares debt
sustainability analysis, detailing the
contributions expected from official
and private creditors

Country seeks financig from the IMF
under a sovereign debt adjustment
Country seeks financing from ESM
program

New lending facility (SDAF) of
IMF and (possibly) amendment of
IMF articles to immunize against
holdouts

Statutory

Sovereign Debt
Adjustment Program

International Solutions

Contractual

Status quo

No Solution

Type

Characteristics
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